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Barbed Wire in the Borderland: Statute
of Limitations Choices for Wrongful
Discharge Claims
MARY E. MILLER*
In creating exceptions to the doctrine permitting termination of an
"at-will" employee without cause, courts have focused largely
upon the reasons for creating particular exceptions to the doctrine
and the elements of proof needed for each. With the recognition of
the causes of action for wrongful discharge claims, however,
comes a need to examine secondary rules and policies of imple-
mentation, chief among them the choice of appropriate statutes of
limitations. This Article examines the three exceptions to the at-
will doctrine, and explores the typical range of limitations choices
for each. Solutions are suggested which will maximize the en-
forcement goals of the wrongful discharge cause of action, and at
the same time achieve the traditional policies of statutes of
limitations.
INTRODUCTION
The development of different theories of liability for wrongful dis-
charge of at-will employees has precipitated a number of problems,
one of which is choice of a statute of limitations. Drawn from a vari-
ety of choices, the various substantive theories of wrongful discharge
must be matched to the appropriate limitations periods. Unfortu-
nately, the statutes are not congruent within the legal framework of
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obligation and remedy now emerging in wrongful discharge, an area
occupying the "borderland" between contract and tort." The statutes
often require a court to characterize a claim as either contract or
tort or one seeking redress for personal injury or property damage.
Further confusion is added by the existence of special limitations pe-
riods for actions based upon statute. This raises the question of
whether such statutes apply when an element of the claim is deter-
mined by reference to legislative policy.
The emerging law of wrongful discharge represents an area of
complex doctrinal and remedial jurisprudence in the realms of con-
tract, tort, and enforcement of legislative policy. Unfortunately, po-
tential statutes of limitations, relics of a bygone era of legal formal-
ism, are inadequate to meet the demands of new substantive
doctrines. A consistent and principled basis for the choice of a limi-
tations statute is necessary to advance reasoned development and
fair enforcement of the substantive law involved. In the absence of
legislative reassessment, the courts will have to struggle with the pre-
sent statutory categories.
This Article reviews the typical statute of limitations choices as
applied to three developing theories of wrongful discharge: discharge
in violation of public policy, breach of implied-in-fact contract, and
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Fol-
lowing an initial discussion of the history and policies of limitations
periods in general, this Article will analyze the statute of limitations
choices available for each theory of liability. Such an analysis will be
undertaken with a view towards coordinating the purposes of the
substantive doctrine with those of the statute of limitations, and
achieving the goal of doctrinal and remedial consistency when those
purposes are the same. Because the California limitations scheme is
representative,2 these statutes will be used as models both to describe
the problems presented and to suggest avenues of principled solution.
1. Speidel, The Borderland of Contract, 10 N. Ky. L. REV. 163 (1983); W.
PROSSER, The Borderland of Tort and Contract, in SELECTED Topics ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 380 (1954).
2. As discussed in the text infra accompanying notes 3-41, the statutes are Cali-
fornia Civil Procedure Code section 337(1)(four years), section 338(1)(three years), sec-
tion 339(!)(two years), section 340(3)(one year), and section 343(four years). For two
early comparative studies, see Mix, State Statutes of Limitation: Contrasted and Com-
pared, 3 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 106 (1931), and Littel, A Comparison of the Statutes of
Limitations, 21 IND. L.J. 23 (1945).
With regard to the substantive law of wrongful discharge, Professor Estreicher advises
all attorneys to assume that California law applies in discharge cases, for the purpose of
evaluating them in light of the "most restrictive standards." Estreicher, Unjust Dismis-
sal; Preventative Measures, in UNJUST DISMISSAL 1984: EVALUATING, LITIGATING, SET-
TLING, AND AVOIDING CLAIMS 741, 743 (1984).
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THE CALIFORNIA STATUTORY SCHEME
The use of a limitations period to restrict legal remedies may be
traced to the 1623 English Limitations Act (Limitations Act).3 It
has been surmised that the purposes of the Limitations Act were to
keep inconsequential claims out of the King's courts and to minimize
the hardship on a poor defendant of defending in those courts.4 De-
pending upon the form of action, the Limitations Act provided dif-
ferent periods of limitation.5 The choice of a four-year period for
personal injury actions, and a six-year period for most other claims,
is thought to reflect an early disfavor of the former as well as a rec-
ognition of attendant evidentiary problems.6
The Limitations Act had a profound, and still apparent, influence
upon American statutes of limitations. Regarding both English law
and the early American statutes, the intent of the enacting legisla-
tures is not readily apparent. One only can speculate as to the pur-
pose behind the choices made in distinguishing types of actions and
limitations periods chosen.8 This difficulty in discerning a consistent
3. Limitations Act, 1623, 21 Jac. ch. 16. For a history of the statute of limita-
tions, see Developments in the Law, Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177,
1178-81 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
4. See Developments, supra note 3, at 1178.
5. "Actions of trespass quare clausumfregit, debt, detinue, replevin, and actions
on the case or for account were limited to six years; trespass, assault, battery, wounding,
and imprisonment four years; and actions on the case for words two years." Develop-
ments, supra note 3, at 1192 n.148.
6. See id.
7. See id. at 1192. The amended New York Code of 1849 (Field Code) substi-
tuted code definitions for the common law forms of action specified in the former statute
of limitations and derived from the Limitations Act. See Gaines v. City of New York,
215 N.Y. 533, 109 N.E. 594 (1915); see also Bollinger v. National Fire Ins. Co., 25 Cal.
2d 399, 154 P.2d 399 (1944). For a history of the codification in California, see Blume,
Adoption of the Field Code in California: A Chapter in American Legal History, 17
HASTINGS L.J. 701 (1966). The six-year period may still be seen in the laws of many
states. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 260, § 2 (West Supp. 1985); NEW YORK
CIv. PRAC. LAW § 213 (McKinney Supp. 1984); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §
600.5807(8) (West 1968); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 5527 (Purdon Supp. 1985). See
generally Hendrickson v. Sears, 365 Mass. 83, 310 N.E.2d 131 (1974); Mix, supra note
2, at 108.
8. See Developments, supra note 3, at 1185 ("[L]egislatures seldom reconsider
[statutes of limitations] in the light of the various functions that they actually perform.")
Occasionally a legislature provides a glimpse into its reasoning, usually when a special
statute of limitations is involved. For example, in amending the New York Civil Practice
Law in 1981 to revive or extend "Agent Orange" claims and to provide an alternate
discovery accrual date, the New York Legislature made findings that the former statute
of limitations, Civil Practice Law section 214, was enacted by a legislature principally
motivated by the desire to discourage "belated litigation" which resulted in the failing
memory of witnesses and the disappearance of evidence. "It was never the intent of the
legislative concept of statutes of limitations poses particular
problems in the nether regions of tort and contract, which today are
populated by claims such as those for wrongful discharge.
The current judicial perception of statutes of limitations focuses
upon several factors: the need for repose for the defendant in order-
ing his or her affairs;9 inhospitality to "stale" claims for which evi-
dence has become unreliable through lapse of time, lost physical or
documentary evidence, and faded memories; 10 and the desire to pun-
ish a plaintiff whose lack of diligence raises the suspicion of negli-
gence at a minimum," and the suspicion of false or fictitious claims
at a maximum.' 2 Sometimes cited as a reason for a short limitations
period is distaste for a particular type of claim' 3 or a de minimus
claim." In terms of public policy, a short limitations period may
have a salutary stabilizing effect on commerce by limiting the num-
ber of outstanding unsettled claims,' 5 and on the legal system itself
legislature in imposing limitations, to foreclose the citizens of this state from prosecuting
legitimate claims, provided such claims are diligently and expeditiously pursued." 1981
N.Y. Law ch. 266, § 1. Similar statutes are found in Florida, see FLA. STAT. ANN. §
95.11(4)(f) (West Supp. 1985), and in Delaware, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8131
(Supp. 1985). See Bollinger v. National Fire Ins. Co., 25 Cal. 2d 399, 154 P.2d 399
(1944)(short statute of limitations for insurance claims the result of insurer's insistence
on protection against fraud); Klein v. Catalano, 386 Mass. 701, 437 N.E.2d 514
(1982)(history of passage of statute of limitations for claims for faulty architecture); see
also Securities-intermountain, Inc. v. Sunset Fuel Co., 289 Or. 243, 611 P.2d 1158
(1980) (history of statute of limitations for injury claims arising from improvement to
real property); Comment, Limitation of Action Statutes for Architects and Builders -
Blueprints for Non Action, 18 CATH. L. REV. 361 (1969).
9. See Weber v. Harbor Comm'rs, 85 U.S. 57 (1873); Neff v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 30 Cal. 2d 165, 169, 180 P.2d 900, 903 (1947); Tevis v. Tevis, 79 N.J. 422,
430, 400 A.2d 1189, 1194 (1979); Kittinger v. Boeing Co., 21 Wash. App. 484, 585 P.2d
812 (1978).
10. See Order of R.R. Tel'rs v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348
(1944); Davies v. Krasna, 14 Cal. 2d 502, 512, 535 P.2d 1161, 1168, 121 Cal. Rptr. 705,
712 (1975) (en bane); California Savings & Loan Soc'y v. Culver, 127 Cal. 107, 59 P.
292 (1899); Beynon Bldg. Corp. v. National Guardian Life Ins. Co., 118 I11. App. 3d
754, 455 N.E.2d 246 (1983); Hossler v. Barry, 403 A.2d 762, 766 (Me. 1979); Harig v.
Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 284 Md. 70, 394 A.2d 299 (1978); Cassidy v. Finley, 173
Mont. 475, 568 P.2d 142 (1977).
11. See W. BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES 188 (1803); Shain v. Sresovich, 104
Cal. 402, 406, 38 P. 51, 52 (1894).
12. See Weber v. Harbor Comm'rs, 85 U.S. 57 (1873); Barclay v. Blackinton,
127 Cal. 189, 59 P. 834 (1899); Lamont v. Wolfe, 142 Cal. App. 3d 375, 380, 190 Cal.
Rptr. 874, 877 (1983); Kittinger v. Boeing Co., 21 Wash. App. 484, 585 P.2d 812
(1978).
13. See Barclay v. Blackinton, 127 Cal. 189, 59 P. 834 (1899); Developments,
supra note 3, at 1185-86.
14. See Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879); Developments, supra note
3, at 1185; see also Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Superior Court, 233 Cal. App. 2d 333,
339, 43 Cal. Rptr. 476, 480 (1965), overruled on other grounds sub nom. Van Tassel v.
Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 624, 526 P.2d 969, 116 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1974).
15. See Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 296 Md. 656, 665, 464 A.2d 1020,
1026 (1983).
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by promoting judicial economy.'8 The only restriction placed upon a
legislature in devising a statute of limitations period is that it must
not be so unreasonable as to amount to a denial of justice.17
The California scheme remains largely unchanged from that en-
acted by the first state legislature in 1850,18 which was based in
large part upon the New York Field Code of 1849.19
The 1850 statute distinguished between actions upon a contract or
obligation founded upon a written instrument, which had a four-year
limitations period, and actions upon a contract or obligation not
founded upon a written instrument, which had a two-year limitations
period.20 This latter period was subsequently held to apply to im-
plied-in-fact contracts and quasi-contracts as well as to oral agree-
ments.2' The purpose of the distinction in California presumably was
to confer a shorter period where the evidence was oral and thus more
susceptible to loss.22 The present code preserves those distinctions.23
This contrasts with systems in other jurisdictions providing for the
same limitations period for actions based on both written and oral
agreements.24
As originally enacted, the "tort" statute of limitations contained
an enumeration of particular types of personal torts: libel, slander,
assault, battery, and false imprisonment.25 But it was not until 1905
16. Id. at 665, 464 A.2d at 1026.
17. See Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 246 (1944); Lankford v.
Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416 So. 2d 996, 1005 (Ala. 1982); Ocean Shore R.R. v. City
of Santa Cruz, 198 Cal. App. 2d 267, 272, 17 Cal. Rptr. 892, 895 (1961).
18. 1850 Cal. Stat. 343.
19. See Blume, supra note 7, at 108; Bollinger v. National Fire Ins. Co., 25 Cal.
2d 399, 154 P.2d 399 (1944).
20. 1850 Cal. Stat. 343.
21. See Davies v. Krasna, 14 Cal. 3d 502, 509 n.6, 535 P.2d 1161, 1166 n.6, 121
Cal. Rptr. 705, 710 n.6 (1975)(en banc).
22. See Developments, supra note 3, at 1195; Kersten v. Continental Bank, 129
Ariz. 44, 47, 628 P.2d 592, 595 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981); Matherly v. Hanson, 359 N.W.2d
450, 457 (Iowa 1984); El Ranco, Inc. v. New York Meat & Provision Co., 88 Nev. 111,
116, 493 P.2d 1318, 1322 (1972).
23. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 339(1) (West Supp. 1985) (two years); CAL CIv.
PROC. CODE § 337(1)(four years)(West Supp. 1985). Other states also have a shorter
period for unwritten contracts. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5526 (Purdon Supp.
1985) (five years); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5525 (Purdon Supp. 1985)(four years);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 13-205 (five years); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, % 13-206 (Smith-
Hurd 1985)(ten years); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.07 (Page 1984) (six years); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.06 (Page 1981)(fifteen years).
24. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-110 (1974)(six years); MICH. ComP. LAWS ANN. §
600.5807 (West 1968)(six years); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.05(1) (West 1985)(six
years).
25. 1850 Cal. Stat. 819. This probably was due to the influence of the use of the
English forms of action as categories of limitations in the Limitation Act. See supra note
that the California Legislature added to this one-year provision a
general category for personal injury torts,26 a categorization which
still exists today.
27
The one-year period for personal injury torts operates to hamper
such actions, and it highlights the favor which contract claims, par-
ticularly written contract claims, are endowed. The short period is
necessary because evidence in such actions is inclined to go stale
quickly. 28 Further, the disparity between time periods for contract
and personal injury tort cases also provides incentive for a plaintiff to
recharacterize claims as contractual.
Although some states have one limitations period for all torts,29
California and other states further have distinguished personal in-
jury torts from torts for injury to property interests.30 With the de-
velopment of torts involving invasions of intangible personal property
interests, for which the damage was economic, the California courts
were faced with an early categorization issue for statute of limita-
tions purposes. After 1905 California's one-year tort statute applied
to actions for invasions of personal rights.3' Because California's
residual statute of limitations was held to apply only to actions in
equity, 32 a category was needed for legal actions not involving injury
to the person. The language of the oral and implied contract statute
was most receptive. Thus it was held that such torts were actions
based upon an "obligation . . . not founded upon an instrument in
writing". 33 As a result, the one-year statute applies to personal in-
5 and accompanying text.
26. 1905 Cal. Stat. 231.
27. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 340(3) (West Supp. 1985). A three year statute
exists for torts involving injury to goods or chattels. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 338(3)
(West Supp. 1985).
28. See Lamont v. Wolfe, 142 Cal. App. 3d 375, 380, 190 Cal. Rptr. 874, 877
(1983); Developments, supra note 3, at 1185; Comment, Tort in Contract: A New Stat-
ute of Limitations, 52 OR. L. REV. 91, 92 (1972).
29. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-542 (1982) (two years); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 12-301(7) (1981) (three years); VA. CODE § 243 (1984) (two years).
30. ALASKA STAT. § 6-2-34(1)(1975) (personal injury); ALASKA STAT. § 6-2-
34(2)(1975) (property damage); CAL CIv. PROC. CODE § 340 (West 1982) (personal
injury); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 338 (Vest 1982) (property damage); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 10, § 8106 (1975) (personal injury); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8107 (1975) (property
damage); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(o) (West 1982) (personal injury); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
95.11(h) (West 1982)(property damage); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, 13-202 (Smith-
Hurd 1985) (personal injury); ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 110, 1 13-205 (Smith-Hurd 1985)
(property damage); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-510(4)(1983) (personal injury); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-513(2) (1983) (property damage); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.05(5) (West
1985) (personal injury); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.05(4) (West 1985) (property damage).
31. See Chain v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 62 Cal. App. 3d 310, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 860 (1976) (invasion of privacy).
32. See Piller v. Southern Pac. R.R., 52 Cal. 42 (1877); Dore v. Thornburgh, 90
Cal. 64, 27 P. 30 (1891).
33. Wood v. Currey, 57 Cal. 208, 209 (1881) (unlawful levy). Examples of appli-
cation of the statute may be found in Smith's Cash Store v. First Nat'l Bank, 149 Cal.
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jury torts, and a two-year statute applies to business or economic
torts involving the invasion to these intangible property interests.
34
No explanation ever has been attempted for a purpose behind the
distinction. If any rationale exists, other than lack of any other ap-
plicable statute, it simply might be a species of favor accorded to
business litigation over personal injury litigation. 5
The original 1850 statute contained a provision for a three-year
period for liability based on statute.36 Separate from this three-year
period was a one-year provision for a statutory action for a penalty
or forfeiture.3 7 Both categories have been retained in California,
while similar provisions are found in the laws of other states.38
Because the three-year limitations period in California is more
hospitable than the period for implied contracts and torts, the dila-
tory plaintiff obviously will attempt to "plead into" a statute. Gener-
ally, the courts express disapproval at such attempts to circumvent a
32, 84 P. 663 (1906) (wrongful refusal to pay check); Churchill v. Pacific Improvement
Co., 96 Cal. 490, 31 P. 560 (1892)(innkeeper negligence); McCusker v. Walker, 77 Cal.
208, 19 P. 382 (1888) (malicious attachment); McFaddin v. H.S. Crocker Co., 219 Cal.
App. 2d 585, 33 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1963)(interference with business); Italiani v. Metro-
Goldwyn Mayer Corp., 45 Cal. App. 2d 464, 114 P.2d 370 (1941)(misappropriation of
screenplay); Baxter v. King, 81 Cal. App. 2d 192, 253 P. 172 (1927) (refusal to deliver
corporate dividends).
34. See TU-VU Drive-In Corp. v. Davies, 66 Cal. 2d 435, 426 P.2d 505, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 105 (1967).
35. In Neikirk v. Central Ill. Light Co., 128 I1. App. 3d 1069, 471 N.E.2d 1027
(1984), the plaintiff attempted to argue that justice and logic were violated by different
statutes of limitations for personal injury and property damage torts. The court rejected
this argument, reasoning that it would not disturb the legislative determination implicit
in the statutes.
36. 1850 Cal. Stat. 231.
37. Id.
38. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 338(1) (West Supp. 1985) (three years); CAL Civ.
PROC. CODE § 340(1) (West Supp. 1985) (one year); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
12-541 (1982) (liability based on statute); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8106 (1975) (lia-
bility based on statute); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(3)(f) (West 1982)(liability based on
statute); IDAHO CODE § 5-218 (1979) (liability based on statute); IDAHO CODE § 5-219
(1979) (penalty); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-512 (1983) (liability based on statute); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-514 (1983) (penalty); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.120(2) (Baldwin
1982) (liability based on statute); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.120(3)(Baldwin 1983)
(penalty); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5809 (West 1968) (penalty); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 516-120(c) (Vernon 1952) (liability based on statute); N.Y. CiV. PRAC. LAW § 214(2)
(McKinney 1972) (both); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.07 (Page 1981) (liability based
on statute); OR. REV. STAT. § 12.080(2)(1983) (liability based on statute); OR. REV.
STAT. § 12.100 (1983)(penalty); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.93 (West 1983) (liability based
on statute). In the absence of a "based on statute" provision, such an action may be
governed by the residual statute. See Blakeslee's Storage Warehouse, Inc. v. City of
Chicago, 369 II1. 480, 17 N.E.2d 1 (1938). In Texas, such actions are placed within the
category of actions on debt. Cf. McGuire v. Baker, 421 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 820 (1970).
common-law claim.39
California's residual statute for all other claims provides for a rel-
atively short four-year period. 40 Because the statute initially was in-
terpreted to apply only to equitable claims, only recently has it re-
ceived extended application.41
PRINCIPLES FOR CHOOSING A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The choice of a statute of limitations in wrongful discharge cases
can present three types of problems. The first is the choice between a
contract statute and a tort statute. The second is the choice between
a personal injury tort statute and a property damage tort statute.
Finally, a third choice sometimes must be made between a statute of
limitations for claims based on statute and a statute of limitations
for other claims.
Traditional Principles and Approaches
The body of law concerning the characterization of claims as con-
tract or tort, as well as that concerning appropriate allocation of
remedies for personal injury or property damage, in many cases is
the result of issues presented in situations unrelated to a statute of
limitations problem.42 In many of these cases the solution has been
either to characterize the claim as "sound[ing] both in contract and
tort, ' 43 or to award a remedy traditionally not permitted.44 Mechani-
cal application to limitations problems of terminology developed in
another context yields inconsistent and confusing results. 45 Further-
39. See Franceschi v. Scott, 7 Cal. App. 2d 494, 46 P.2d 764 (1935); McFarland
v. Cordero, 99 Cal. App. 352, 278 P. 889 (1929); Churchill v. Pacific Improvement Co.,
96 Cal. 490, 31 P.2d 516 (1892); see also City of Los Angeles v. Belridge Oil Co., 42
Cal. 2d 823, 271 P.2d 5 (1954), appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 907 (1955).
40. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 343 (West Supp. 1985).
41. See Marshall v. Kleppe, 637 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1980) (applying section 343
to action for a fifth amendment violation). In some states the residual statute is held to
apply to newer torts not found at common law. See Citizens for Pretrial Justice v. Gold-
farb, 415 Mich. 255, 327 N.W.2d 910 (1982).
42. Securities-Intermountain, Inc. v. Sunset Fuel Co., 289 Or. 243, 611 P.2d
1158 (1980).
43. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 432, 426 P.2d 173, 178, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 13, 18 (1967); see also Purdy v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 157 Cal. App. 3d 59, 203
Cal. Rptr. 524 (1984) (assignability).
44. See Allen v. Jones, 104 Cal. App. 3d 207, 163 Cal. Rptr. 445 (1980); State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 9 Cal. App. 3d 508, 527, 88 Cal. Rptr.
246, 258 (1970).
45. See Developments, supra note 3, at 1195-96. The law has been described as a
"snarl of utter confusion." W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 434. The same authority also
has commented that "[t]here is probably no more barren and unrewarding group of deci-
sions to be found in the law." Id. at 432; see also W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 92
(4th ed. 1971); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Enco Assocs., 43 N.Y.2d 389, 372 N.E.2d 555,
401 N.Y.S.2d 767 (1977); Securities-Intermountain, Inc. v. Sunset Fuel Co., 289 Or.
243, 611 P.2d 1158 (1980).
[VOL. 23: 833, 1986] Statute of Limitations Choices
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
more, the carryover of liberal claim characterization to a statute of
limitations context, coupled with modern liberal pleading rules, per-
mits plaintiffs to avoid short statutes by pleading their claims as
those to which longer statutes apply. But courts, conscious of their
obligation to give effect to the statutes, have looked unfavorably
upon such attempts.4
Courts often feel compelled to follow the plaintiff's complaint in
order to assign an appropriate statute of limitations. The goal has
been to develop guidelines for such an analysis; the attempt, how-
ever, largely has been unsuccessful. Many courts decreed the need
for an assessment of "interests" or "rights" at stake in choosing a
limitations statute.4 This required an examination of the pleading in
order to determine the "gravamen" 4  or "gist" 49 of the action, as
well as identification of applicable principles of substantive law.50
While the pleading itself was not determinative, the characterization
of the "gist" of the matter was made by examining the pleading.5 1
Some jurisdictions, perhaps more aware of the effect of an adverse
ruling upon a plaintiff who might not actually have been able to pre-
dict which statute would apply, announced as a general principle
that in cases of ambiguity the longer statute would apply.52 This
46. See Christ v. Lipsitz, 99 Cal. App. 3d 894, 160 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1979); Ye-
ager v. Dunnavan, 26 Wash. 2d 559, 174 P.2d 755 (1946) (plaintiff not permitted to
characterize a tort action as a contract action in order to avoid the statute of limitations);
see also Brueck v. Krings, 230 Kan. 466, 638 P.2d 904 (1982).
47. See Hedlund v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 3d 695, 704, 669 P.2d 41, 45, 194
Cal. Rptr. 805, 809 (1983); Davies v. Krasna, 14 Cal. 3d 502, 515-16, 535 P.2d 1161,
1170, 121 Cal. Rptr. 705, 714 (1975); Sandbulte v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 343
N.W.2d 457, 462 (Iowa 1984); Wilkerson v. Carlo, 101 Mich. App. 629, 300 N.W.2d
658 (1981); Mosley v. Federals Dep't Stores, Inc., 85 Mich. App. 333, 271 N.W.2d 224
(1978).
48. See Leeper v. Beltrami, 53 Cal. 2d 195, 208, 347 P.2d 12, 21, 1 Cal. Rptr.
12, 21 (1959).
49. See Craft v. Rice, 671 S.W.2d 247 (Ky. 1984); Elizabeth Gamble Deaconess
Home v. Turner Constr., 14 Ohio App. 3d 281, 470 N.E.2d 950 (1984).
50. See Leeper, 53 Cal. 2d at 214, 347 P.2d at 24, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
51. See Au v. Au, 63 Hawaii 210, 214, 626 P.2d 173, 177 (1981); Malone v.
University of Kan. Medical Center, 220 Kan. 371, 374, 552 P.2d 885, 888 (1976); Eliza-
beth Gamble Deaconess Home v. Turner Constr., 14 Ohio App. 3d 281, 470 N.E.2d 950
(1984).
52. See Marshall v. Kleppe, 637 F.2d 1217, 1224 (9th Cir. 1980); Woodward v.
Chirco Constr. Co., 141 Ariz. 520, 687 P.2d 1275 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984), affd as modi-
fled, 141 Ariz. 514, 687 P.2d 1269 (1984)(en banc); Sonne v. Sacks, 314 A.2d 194 (Del.
1973); Au v. Au, 63 Hawaii 263, 264, 626 P.2d 173, 182 (1981); Dickens v. Puryear,
302 N.C. 437, 276 S.E.2d 325 (1981); Williams v. Lee Way Motor Freight, 688 P.2d
1294, 1297 (Okla. 1984); see also County of Los Angeles v. Security First Nat'l Bank,
84 Cal. App. 2d 575, 580, 191 P.2d 78, 82 (1948) (a strained construction of limitations
statute in barring claim should be avoided).
may have helped the litigating plaintiff, but the statute then became
applicable to all such subsequent claims. The results have been de-
scribed as the product of ad hoc determination rather than the prod-
uct of any coherent legal theory.
53
Choice Between Contract and Tort Statutes
The problem of choosing between a contract or tort statute of lim-
itations is the product of two developments in the law: the evolution
of contract obligations into tort obligations, exemplified by the law of
professional malpractice and products liability; and the rise of new
types of tort obligations imposed upon parties to a contract, epito-
mized by the bad faith insurance cases. These developments are part
of a larger trend towards accountability in contract beyond the pe-
rimeters of agreement, fueled by the development of more sophisti-
cated concepts of contract obligation and remedy.
54
These types of claims do not fall neatly into the traditional catego-
ries of tort or contract, that is, tort encompassing a legally-imposed
obligation and contract governing an obligation voluntarily under-
taken by agreement.5 5 In the absence of agreement, these obligations
would not exist, even though they are not the clear product of the
parties' intent.
The procedural and remedial aspects of such claims often force
their characterization as tort or contract. In many cases, damage has
been the determinative issue, as the courts attempt to distinguish be-
tween the interests protected by, and remedies imposed for, viola-
53. See Securities-Intermountain, Inc. v. Sunset Fuel Co., 289 Or. 243, 252, 611
P.2d 1158, 1163 (1980); Note, Contorts: Patrolling the Borderland of Contract and Tort
in Legal Malpractice Actions, 22 B.C.L. REV. 545 (1981).
54. See G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 90 (1975); Note, "Contort".
Tortious Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Noninsur-
ance Commercial Contracts - Its Existence and Desirability, 60 NOTRE DAME LAW. 510
(1985); Speidel, supra note 1. One court has suggested that the search for new forms of
tort relief may be motivated by a desire for vengeance in business disputes. See Quigley
v. Pet, Inc., 162 Cal. App. 3d 223, 235, 208 Cal. Rptr. 394, 401, modified, 162 Cal. App.
3d 877, 208 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1984).
55. See Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 557 F. Supp. 230, 237 (D.
Mass. 1983); Tamarac Dev. Co. v. Delameter, Freund & Assocs., P.A., 234 Kan. 618,
675 P.2d 361 (1984); Elizabeth Gamble Deaconess Home v. Turner Constr. Co., 14 Ohio
App. 3d 281, 470 N.E.2d 950 (1984). But see Paver & Wildfoerster v. Catholic High
School Ass'n, 38 N.Y.2d 669, 675, 345 N.E.2d 565, 570, 382 N.Y.S.2d 22, 27 (1976),
stating
The distinctions between contracts and torts are not contained in the natural
order but are the products of the faltering legal grammar that men apply to the
facts of life in order to make them tractable to verbalized rules. The distinc-
tions, however, are not to be confused with pronouncements from Mt. Sinai.
See also Ashmun v. Nichols, 92 Or. 223, 234, 180 P. 510, 512 (1919) ("Perhaps under
our Code systems, we should not attempt to place too much stress upon a somewhat
arbitrary and ill-defined distinction between torts and contracts.").
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tions of the tort and contract theories of liability. 56 Other cases in-
volve less determinative issues such as venue
57 and defenses.58
The cases are inconsistent; some courts characterize the claims as
contractual, 59 while others call them tortious.60 In choosing a statute
of limitations, some courts attempt a distinction based upon the
source of the obligation breached. For example, a suit for breach of
an obligation to achieve a specific result is based upon contract and
thereby is treated under the applicable contract statute of limita-
tions. On the other hand, a suit involving a mere promise to perform,
enhanced by the imposition of an obligation regarding the quality of
performance, is determined by reference to tort principles.6 ' While
this test may be useful in malpractice cases,62 in many situations it is
difficult to appreciate the difference. 63 Moreover, such a rule makes
56. See Hart Eng'g Co. v. FHC Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1471 (D.R.I. 1984) (no
negligence claim for economic loss resulting from defective products); Bostwick v. Fore-
most Ins. Co., 539 F. Supp. 517 (D. Mont. 1982); L.L. Cole & Son, Inc. v. Hickman,
282 Ark. 6, 665 S.W.2d 278 (1984); Guarantee Abstract & Title Co. v. Interstate Fire
& Casualty Co., 232 Kan. 76, 652 P.2d 665 (1982); cf. Tate v. Mountain States Tel. &
Tel. Co., 647 P.2d 58 (Wyo. 1982) (contract limitations-of-damages provision inapplica-
ble to negligence claim).
57. See Davidson v. Hess, 673 S.W.2d 111 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
58. See Crowder v. Vanendeale, 564 S.W.2d 879 (Mo. 1978)(en banc) (suit for
breach of implied warranty against contractor better treated as contract case in terms of
defenses and proof); see also Malone v. University of Kan. Medical Center, 220 Kan.
371, 552 P.2d 885 (1976)(dealing with immunity).
59. See Dumas v. Southern Guar. Ins. Co., 408 So.2d 86 (Ala. 1981)(tort statute
applied to bad faith claim against insurer); Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50
Cal. 2d 654, 662, 328 P.2d 198, 203 (1958)("because it was as much a part of the
instrument as if it were written out," the choice was given to the plaintifi)(en banc);
Nowakowski v. Rozbicki, 39 Conn. Supp. 454, 466 A.2d 353 (1983)(attorney malprac-
tice); Ragnar Benson, Inc. v. Bethel Mart Assocs., 308 Pa. Super. 405, 454 A.2d 599
(1982) (commercial contract).
60. See Davis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 545 F. Supp. 370 (D. Nev.
1982) (applying Nevada law); Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 668 P.2d 213 (Mont.
1983).
61. See Video Corp. of America v. Frederick Flatto Assocs., 85 A.D.2d 448, 448
N.Y.S.2d 498 (1982), afi'd as modified, 58 N.Y.2d 1026, 448 N.E.2d 1350, 462
N.Y.S.2d 439 (1983); Erickson Hardwood Co. v. North Pac. Lumber Co., 70 Or. App.
557, 690 P.2d 1071 (1984), review denied, 298 Or. 705, 695 P.2d 1371 (1985); Yeager v.
Dunnavan, 26 Wash. 2d 559, 174 P.2d 755 (1946).
62. See, e.g., Barnard v. Dilley, 134 Mich. App. 375, 350 N.W.2d 887 (1984).
63. See Tamarac Dev. Co., Inc. v. Delamater, Freund & Assocs., P.A., 234 Kan.
618, 619-20, 675 P.2d 361, 363 (1984). The court in Securities-Intermountain, Inc. v.
Sunset Fuel Co., 289 Or. 243, 260, 611 P.2d 1158, 1167 (1980), cautioned that the rule
called for "close decisions." An example of an attempt to deal with the rule is found in
Erickson Hardwood Co. v. North Pac. Lumber Co., 70 Or. App. 557, 690 P.2d 1071
(1984), in which the court, interpreting allegations of breach of fiduciary duty for statute
of limitations purposes, held that the breach sounded in tort even though the action was
in contract.
little sense when attempting to characterize the suit for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. A distinction not
susceptible to prediction and reliance hardly is satisfactory, particu-
larly in the realm of determining an appropriate statute of
limitations.
Some states have imposed a statutory solution to the limitations
problem. Such legislative action amounts to an abandonment of the
tort-contract distinction in favor of a single limitations period for
certain categories of cases.64 With regard to the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, some jurisdictions are permitting the
plaintiff to "elect" a statute of limitations by choosing a remedy. 5
Such a rule can permit a plaintiff claiming only contract-type dam-
ages to sacrifice the larger tort recovery in order to avoid the bar of
the statute of limitations. 66 The policy of affording a shorter statute
to tort claims for personal injury and punitive damages is not under-
mined by such an approach.
The difficulty with this approach stems from the breakdown and
readjustment of old tort-contract remedy distinctions. While one as-
pect of this breakdown manifests itself in the creation of new torts
arising out of the contract relationship, it also may be seen in the
64. For example, many states have one statute of limitations for products liability
cases. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2803 (Supp. 1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(14)
(West 1982); IDAHO CODE § 6-1403(2) (Supp. 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 110, 113-213
(Smith-Hurd 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-2-2 (Burns 1973); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 600.5803(9) (West Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.05(2) (West Supp.
1985); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-224 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-D:2 (1983);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-103 (1980).
A single statute of limitations for malpractice cases also is popular. See, e.g., 1985
Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 84 (approved by the Governor on April 16, 1985)(medical); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-584 (West Supp. 1985)(medical); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, §
8128 (Supp. 1984)(medical); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(4)(a) (West Supp. 1985)(other
than medical malpractice); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.114(4)(b)) (West Supp. 1985)(medi-
cal); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, 1 13-212 (Smith-Hurd 1985) (medical); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 34-4-9-1 (Burns Supp. 1985)(medical); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 260, § 4 (West
Supp. 1985); MICH. Coi. LAWS ANN. § 600.5805 (West Supp. 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 516-105 (Vernon Supp. 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 516.140 (Vernon Supp. 1985)(medi-
cal); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 214 (McKinney Supp. 1985)(other than medical); N.Y.
CIv. PRAC. LAW § 214-A (McKinney Supp. 1985)(medical); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2305.11 (Page Supp. 1985); TEx. CIv. CODE ANN. § 4590(i) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
65. See McDowell v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 404 F. Supp. 136 (C.D. Cal.
1975) (applying California law); Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654,
663, 328 P.2d 198, 203 (1958) (noting that personal injury negligence cases are always
treated as torts); Frazier v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 169 Cal. App. 3d 90, 214 Cal.
Rptr. 883 (1985); see also Spanish Fort Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Sebrite Corp., 369 So. 2d
777 (Ala. 1979) (election between fraud and contract theories); Succession of Dubos,
453 So. 2d 323 (La. Ct. App. 1984). The term "election" is slightly deceptive. The plain-
tiff is allowed to proceed upon whichever theory is not precluded by the statute of
limitations.
66. Often from a practical perspective the difference between tort damages and
contract damages is not substantial. Video Corp. of America v. Frederick Flatto Assocs.,
85 A.D.2d 448, 451, 448 N.Y.S.2d 498, 501 (1982), affid as modified, 58 N.Y.2d 1026,
448 N.E.2d 1350, 462 N.Y.S. 2d 439 (1983)(malpractice).
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willingness of courts to authorize the award of emotional distress
damages for simple breach of contract, at least in cases in which
contract damage principles of foreseeability are not compromised.67
To the extent that the longer limitations period for contract reflects a
determination that claims based upon agreement are preferred, such
a policy is not undermined by application of a contract statute de-
spite allegations of emotional distress. Arguably, however, the emo-
tional distress claim resembles the type of personal injury damages
intended by the legislature to be governed by the shorter tort period.
If any clearer line can be drawn between contract and tort, it can
be drawn between claims supporting punitive damage allegations
and those which do not. Traditionally, punitive damages have not
been awarded in contract cases for policy reasons deeply embedded
in the law of contract,68 including the advantage of calculating with
certainty the amount of damage and the desire to permit efficient
67. See Allen v. Jones, 104 Cal. App. 3d 207, 211, 163 Cal. Rptr. 445, 448
(1980); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 9 Cal. App. 3d 508, 527-29,
88 Cal. Rptr. 246, 258 (1970); Dold v. Outrigger Hotel, 54 Hawaii 18, 501 P.2d 368
(1972); Kewin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 409 Mich. 401, 295 N.W.2d 50
(1980); Guerin v. New Hampshire Catholic Charities, Inc., 120 N.H. 501, 418 A.2d 224
(1980); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 comment a (1981). The
principle stems from the damage rule announced in Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341,
156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854), a "fixed star in the jurisprudential firmament." G. GILMORE,
supra note 54, at 83; cf. Quigley v. Pet, Inc., 162 Cal. App. 3d 223, 208 Cal. Rptr. 394
modified, 162 Cal. App. 3d 877, 208 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1984)(no emotional distress dam-
ages for breach of commercial contract); Loehr v. Ventura Community College Dist.,
147 Cal. App. 3d 1071, 1081 n.4, 195 Cal. Rptr. 576, 582 n.4 (1983)(citing 1903 author-
ity for the proposition that damages for emotional distress cannot be awarded in a dis-
charge contract case); Valentine v. General Am. Credit, Inc., 123 Mich. App. 521, 526,
332 N.W.2d 591, 594 (1983), affd, 420 Mich. 256, 362 N.W.2d 628 (1984) (refusal to
allow emotional distress damages for breach of employment contract, characterizing it as
a "commercial contract").
68. See, e.g., L.L. Cole & Son, Inc. v. Hickman, 282 Ark. 6, 665 S.W.2d 278
(1984); Quigley v. Pet, Inc., 162 Cal. App. 3d 223, 208 Cal. Rptr. 394, modified, 162
Cal. App. 3d 877, 208 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1984); Pogge v. Fullerton Lumber Co., 277
N.W.2d 916 (Iowa 1979); General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 281 Md. 627, 381 A.2d 16
(1977); Kewin v. Massachusetts Life Ins. Co., 409 Mich. 401, 295 N.W.2d 50 (1980).
But see Vernon Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 264 Ind. 599, 349 N.E.2d 173
(1976)(punitive damages allowed upon proof of serious wrong by contracting party, tor-
tious in nature, although not an independent tort). In Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 105
S. Ct. 1904 (1985), the Supreme Court remarked that a tort suit against an insurer for
breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing was nothing more than "a way to plead
a certain kind of contract violation in tort in order to recover exemplary damages not
otherwise available .... " Allis-Chalmers, 105 S. Ct. at 1914. See generally Mallor,
Punitive Damages for Wrongful Discharge of At Will Employees, 26 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 449, 485-87 (1985); Note, Punitive Damages in Contract Actions - Are the Ex-
ceptions Swallowing the Rule?, 20 WASHBURN L.J. 86 (1980); Speidel, supra note 1, at
193 ("[Tlhe head and shoulders of the punitive damage camel will soon be . . . inside
the contract tent.").
breaches. 69 Courts for the most part have been unwilling to extend
the concept of punishment to the act of breach of contract. Applica-
tion of a tort statute of limitations to punitive damage allegations is
appropriate to the extent that the statute reflects a legislative judg-
ment that social stability is fostered by a short life span for such
claims. The application of the contract statute would erode this
policy.
Permitting a plaintiff to take advantage of the longer contract lim-
itations period, if he seeks only contract type relief, is a solution that
has been reached by a number of courts.70 In McDowell v. Union
Mutual Life Insurance Co., 1 a federal district court, applying Cali-
fornia statutes of limitations to a bad faith insurance claim, rejected
an analysis based upon the "predominance" of tort or contract ele-
ments. Rather, the court reasoned that the plaintiff was free to make
an "election". 2 The McDowell rationale was followed in Frazier v.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,73 which involved a bad faith claim
against an insurer in which emotional distress damages were sought.
The court interpreted prior case law to indicate that pleading dam-
ages for emotional distress did not amount to an irrevocable election
of the tort remedy, and thus refused to apply the tort statute of limi-
tations.7 4 Instead, the court applied the four-year statute of limita-
tions for written contracts.
The better approach is to abandon any attempt to characterize a
claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing as one based upon tort or contract. In cases in which the claim
sounds in both tort and contract, the claimant should be permitted to
proceed on the theory not barred by the shorter statute of limita-
69. See Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp. 653 F.2d 1208, 1217 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 968, and 454 U.S. 1084 (1981). The efficiency argument has been
criticized in Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REV.
947 (1982).
70. In Rodgers v. Pennsylvania Life Ins. Co., 539 F. Supp. 879 (S.D. Iowa 1982),
the court separated the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
claim into allegations for personal injury and allegations for economic loss. Applying the
personal injury statute of limitations to the former, the Rodgers court dismissed the
claim insofar as it alleged damages for emotional distress, but allowed the plaintiff to
proceed on the allegations of economic loss. See also Campos v. Oldsmobile Div., Gen.
Motors Corp., 71 Mich. App. 23, 246 N.W.2d 352 (1976); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Enco Assocs., 43 N.Y.2d 389, 396-97, 372 N.E.2d 555, 559-60, 401 N.Y.S.2d 767, 771
(1977)(both contract and tort statutes applied; shorter statute barred tort damages);
Williams v. West Pa. Power Co., 502 Pa. 557, 467 A.2d 811 (1983)(plaintiff suing for
breach of warranty has option either of tort or of Uniform Commercial Code statute of
limitations).
71. 404 F. Supp. 136, 145 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
72. Id. at 145 n.7.
73. 169 Cal. App. 3d 90, 214 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1985).
74. Id. at 101, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 889; see also Guerin v. New Hampshire Catho-
lic Charities, Inc., 120 N.H. 501, 506, 418 A.2d 224, 228 (1980)("[S]uffice it to say that
a prayer for such relief does not require that the action be deemed one in tort.").
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tions, with an appropriate restriction of remedy. Thus, if the tort
statute has run, punitive damage allegations could be severed and
dismissed. In jurisdictions refusing to recognize emotional distress
damages in contract actions, such allegations also could be dismissed
if the tort statute has run. But if the jurisdiction does recognize emo-
tional distress awards in contract actions, allegations of such dam-
ages should not prevent application of the contract statute.
Choice Between Personal Injury Action and Property Damage
Action
Many states have a statute of limitations specifically applicable to
personal injury actions. Some statutes specifically govern only ac-
tions "not arising from contract";75 many statutes without such a
restriction have been interpreted to apply only to tort claims. 6 These
statutes often force a choice between a personal injury tort statute
and a property damage tort or residual statute, a choice that has
confused the courts and muddled the law.7
7
Just as the remedial categories separating tort from contract are
experiencing a period of evolution, so too are traditional categories of
personal injury tort and property damage tort. Recognition that tor-
tious invasions of "property" interests may cause personal injury
damages-particularly emotional distress damages-presents the
75. E.g., ALA. CODE § 6-2-39 (1977); ALASKA STAT. § 09.10,070 (1984); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 516-120 (Vernon 1952); OR. REv. STAT. § 12-110 (1983); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 893.53 (West 1983) ("not arising on contract").
76. See McDowell v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 404 F. Supp. 136, 143-44 (C.D.
Cal. 1975)(applying California law); De Malherbe v. International Union of Elevator
Constrs., 449 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Cal. 1978)(applying California law); Developments,
supra note 3, at 1194-95. But see Brown v. Bleiberg, 32 Cal. 3d 426, 186 Cal. Rptr. 228,
651 P.2d 815 (1982)(personal injury statute applies to claim for breach of warranty);
Citizens for Pretrial Justice v. Goldfarb, 415 Mich. 255, 327 N.W.2d 910 (1982); cf.
Elizabeth Gamble Deaconess Home v. Turner Constr. Co., 14 Ohio App. 3d 281, 470
N.E.2d 950 (1984)(interpreting statute applicable to claims involving improvements to
real property). Cases holding that the personal injury statute applies to contract claims
for personal injury include Folladori Indus., Inc. v. Sims Motor Trans. Lines, 51 111. App.
3d 171, 366 N.E. 2d 557 (1977), and Bodne v. Austin, 156 Tenn. 353, 2 S.W.2d 100
(1928). Some personal injury action statutes specifically state that they apply to contract
lawsuits. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 260, § 2A (West Supp. 1985); IOWA
CODE § 614.1 (1950). See generally Note, Warranty: Tort and Contract Characteriza-
tion: Statutes of Limitation, 43 CAL. L. REV. 546 (1955).
77. See McDowell v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 404 F. Supp. 136, 144 (C.D. Cal.
1975)(applying California law). The Michigan experience is chronicled in Huhtala v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 401 Mich. 118, 257 N.W.2d 640 (1977)(action for breach of con-
tract, fraud and estoppel against insurer for failure to settle). A products liability statute
of limitations passed in 1978 alleviated some of the problems illustrated by Huhtala. See
MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5805(9) (West Supp. 1985).
same type of statute of limitations problem found in bad faith cases
in which both types of damages are pleaded. The court is forced ei-
ther to attempt a characterization of the "predominant" nature of
the claim, 78 a useless exercise if the statute expressly commands con-
sideration of the remedy sought, or to permit a plaintiff to elect a
limitations period on the basis of the remedy actually sought.7 9
Liability Based Upon Statute and Suit for Statutory Penalty
Many states create specific statute of limitations for statutory ac-
tions. 80 In California the three-year statute gives a plaintiff more
time to file than do the oral contract or tort statutes.81 No doubt this
reflects a preference for such actions in furtherance of underlying
statutory policy.
Generally, these statutes of limitations have been interpreted re-
strictively: the liability must be one which would not exist but for the
statute.82 Applying this principle, the "based on statute" provision
has been held applicable to a claim based upon a municipal
ordinance.83
In cases in which the cause of action embodied in the statute has
its origins in the common law, the "based on statute" provision will
not apply.84 But the provision does apply in situations in which the
statute itself, as opposed to a contract or principles of tort law, serves
as the source of the rule of decision. 85 Some jurisdictions require that
the statute in question expressly create liability in favor of the indi-
vidual plaintiff or class to which the plaintiff belongs, as distinct
78. Richardson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 117 Cal. App. 3d 8, 172 Cal. Rptr. 423
(1981).
79. Securities-intermountain, Inc. v. Sunset Fuel Co., 289 Or. 243, 611 P.2d
1158 (1980).
80. E.g., ARz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-541 (West 1982) (one year); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 8106 (1975) (three years); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(3)(f) (West 1982)
(four years); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 516.120 (Vernon 1952) (five years); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
893.93(A) (West 1983) (six years).
81. Compare CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 338(1)(West Supp. 1985), with CAL. CIv.
PROC. CODE § 339(l)(West Supp. 1985) (two years for oral contract), and CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 340(3) (West Supp. 1985) (one year for personal injury torts).
82. See Maricopa County Mun. Water Conservation Dist. No. 1 v. Warford, 69
Ariz. 1, 206 P.2d 1168 (1949).
83. See City of Los Angeles v. Belridge Oil Co., 42 Cal. 2d 823, 271 P.2d 5
(1954), appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 907 (1955). But see DeCelle v. City of Alameda,
221 Cal. App. 2d 528, 34 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1963).
84. Hyatt Chalet Motels, Inc. v. Salem Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 298 F.
Supp. 699, 703 (D. Or. 1968) (applying Oregon law). See Developments, supra note 3,
at 1196-97.
85. See County of San Diego v. Sanfax Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 862, 568 P.2d 363, 140
Cal. Rptr. 638 (1977)(en banc); cf. Wilson v. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. 1938, (1985)(analogiz-
ing to tort law claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 governed by personal injury limita-
tions statutes).
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from the general public."
Generally, the "statutory penalty"' 7 statute of limitations is fairly
short, which probably indicates a disfavor for such claims and favor
for speedy resolution of "penalty" lawsuits.88 But the provision does
not apply to suits seeking any form of compensatory relief. 9
Though California provides for punitive damages by statute, 0 this
provision alone has been held not to invoke a "statutory penalty"
statute of limitations.9 1 The result surely is correct, for punitive dam-
ages were known at the time the statutes were enacted,92 and the
legislature provided other limitations periods for substantive theories
of liability which supported punitive damage allegations.9" While the
availability of punitive damages may signal that the appropriate
treatment of the claim for limitations purposes is tort law, it does not
warrant treatment of the claim as a statutory penalty.
Suggested General Guidelines
Statutes of limitations are just that: statutes. A court concerned
with judicial restraint in the area of statutory interpretation must
consider whether allowing a plaintiff unfettered freedom to make an
election is contrary to legislative intent. Judicial integrity demands
86. See Carter v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 392 F. Supp. 494 (S.D. Ga. 1974)
(applying Georgia law); Pecenka v. Alquest, 6 Kan. App. 2d 26, 626 P.2d 802
(1981)(statute must disclose legislative intent that disregard of the statute should result
in liability).
87. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
88. See Developments, supra note 3, at 1180.
89. The application of the statutory penalty provision to a wrongful discharge
claim was rejected in Henon v. Lever Bros. Co., 114 I11. App. 3d 608, 449 N.E.2d 196
(1983), and in Yanta v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 66 Wis. 2d 53, 224 N.W.2d 389
(1974). Cf. McDowell v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 404 F. Supp. 136, 146 (C.D. Cal.
1975)(punitive damage allegations in suit for insurer's breach of covenant of good faith
not a statutory penalty).
90. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294 (West 1973).
91. McDowell v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 404 F. Supp. 136 (C.D. Cal. 1975);
accord Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1984); Jones v. Harding Glass
Co., 619 P.2d 777 (Colo. Ct. App. 1980), vacated on other grounds, 640 P.2d 1123
(Colo. 1982). But, actions in which the imposition of double or treble damages is re-
quired, as opposed to permitted, are considered actions to enforce penalties subject to the
one-year statute. See G.H.I.I. v. MTS, Inc., 147 Cal. App. 3d 256, 195 Cal. Rtpr. 211
(1983).
92. See Dorsey v. Manlove, 14 Cal. 553 (1860). Statutes are to be interpreted by
assuming that the legislature was aware of the existing judicial decisions. Kusior v. Sil-
ver, 54 Cal. 2d 603, 354 P.2d 657, 7 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1960). See generally K. REDDEN,
PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 2.2(A)(2)(1980); Mallor, supra note 68, at 472.
93. This was the reasoning of the court in McDowell v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
404 F. Supp. 136 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
recognition that the categories embodied in the statutes, though they
are inadequate, are indicative of some sort of legislative policy, how-
ever outmoded or imprecise. For example, to the extent that statutes
are more hospitable to claims based on statute or contract than ordi-
nary tort claims, the choice of statute should effectuate that policy.
Similarly, in cases in which possible staleness of evidence will harm
a defendant, a shorter statute should be considered. Courts should
allow more latitude when the plaintiff's claim is a novel one having
elements of several statute of limitations categories. Thus, a policy in
favor of hospitality to plaintiffs in the vindication of particular
rights, recognized by the specific cause of action, should be juxta-
posed against a policy in favor of repose in order to prevent the un-
rest and instability in the workplace that can result from allegations
of wrongful discharge. 4
In addition to considerations of statute of limitations policy, the
choice of a limitations period should be made with reference to the
purposes to be effectuated by the substantive law underlying the as-
serted claim. This principle is under-utilized in state courts when the
issue is a choice of statute for a state claim,9 5 but customarily it is
employed in federal courts when the court is forced to choose a state
statute of limitations for a federal claim and no applicable federal
statute exists.96 A corollary of this principle is that claims effectuat-
ing similar substantive policies should be treated alike for limitations
purposes.
Consistency should be an important goal of any statute of limita-
tions policy-not only consistency of policy but also consistency that
comes from treating similar types of lawsuits in a similar manner.
Such a policy achieves procedural fairness and permits the parties to
predict the lifespan of the claim.97 In the absence of predictability, a
plaintiff does not deserve to be punished for dilatory behavior, and a
defendant cannot anticipate repose in the same fashion as a defend-
ant relying upon a clearly applicable statute.
Finally, clear pleading should be required of a plaintiff.98 Identifi-
94. See De Malherbe v. International Union of Elevator Constrs., 449 F. Supp.
1335 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (employment discrimination).
95. But see Williams v. West Pa. Power Co., 502 Pa. 557, 467 A.2d 811 (1983).
In Williams the court refused to choose a tort statute over a contract statute in a prod-
ucts liability case because doing so would be a move towards restoration of the outmoded
and rejected concept of privity in such actions.
96. See Wilson v. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. 1938 (1985); Occidential Life Ins..Co. v.
EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977); Pauk v. Board of Trustees of City Univ. of N.Y., 654
F.2d 856, 862 (2d Cir. 1981); De Malherbe v. International Union of Elevator Constrs.,
449 F. Supp. 1335, 1340-41 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
97. Wilson v. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. 1938 (1985); see also Note, Statutes of Limita-
tion: Time for Reform in Oklahoma, 33 OKLA. L. REV. 178, 188 (1980).
98. See Knox College v. Celotex Corp., 88 II. 2d 407, 430 N.E.2d 976 (1981);
see also Kamens v. Summit Stainless, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 324, 329 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1984)
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cation of the plaintiff's claim and the type of remedy sought is
needed to aid the court in making the necessary choices, in identify-
ing an election if one is to be permitted, and in achieving the policy
of repose for the defendant which is at the heart of all statutes of
limitations.
APPLICATION OF STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS TO WRONGFUL
DISCHARGE THEORIES OF LIABILITY
The rapidly developing law of wrongful discharge of at-will em-
ployees is widely discussed in the literature,99 and will be summa-
rized to provide a context for the analysis of appropriate statutes of
limitations. The substantive law and policies underlying each of the
three theories will be discussed, and an analysis of the appropriate
(claims for discharge in violation of public policy and for breach of implied contract
separate and distinct; claim brought on one theory will not imply claim on the other); cf.
L.L. Cole & Son, Inc. v. Hickman, 282 Ark. 6, 665 S.W.2d 278 (1984)(clear pleading
required in order to determine whether punitive damages appropriate); Davis v. Tyee
Indus., Inc., 295 Or. 467, 668 P.2d 1186 (1982)(same). But see Cancellier v. Federated
Dep't Stores, Inc., 672 F.2d 1312, 1319 (9th Cir. 1980)(under federal pleading rules,
when complaint alleged discharge in breach of covenant of good faith, specific prayers for
emotional distress and punitive damages were unnecessary).
99. See generally Blades, Employment at Will v. Individual Freedom: On Limit-
ing the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967); Blum-
rosen, Worker's Rights against Employers and Unions: Justice Francis - A Judge for
Our Season, 24 RUTGERS L. REv. 480 (1970); De Giuseppe, The Recognition of Public
Policy Exceptions to the Employment At-Will Rule: A Legislative Function, 11 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 721 (1982); De Giuseppe, The Effect of the Employment-at-Will Rule on
Employee Rights to Job Security and Fringe Benefits, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1 (1981);
Feinman, The Development of the Employment At Will Rule, 20 Am. J. LEG. HIsT. 118
(1978); Glendon & Lev, Changes in the Bonding of the Employment Relationship: An
Essay on the New Property, 20 B.C.L. REV. 457 (1979); Miller & Estes, Recent Judicial
Limitations on the Right to Discharge: A California Trilogy, 16 U.C.D. L. REV. 65
(1982); Peck, Unjust Discharges from Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40
OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1979); Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal:
Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976); Symposium, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 201
(1983); Comment, Protecting the Private Sector At Will Employee Who "Blows the
Whistle". A Cause of Action Based Upon Determinants of Public Policy, 1977 Wis. L.
REV. 777; Note, Protecting Employees At Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public
Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931 (1983); Note, Defining Public Policy Torts in
At-Will Dismissals, 34 STAN. L. REV. 153 (1981); Note, Protecting At Will Employees
Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1816 (1980); Note, Non-Statutory Causes of Action for an Employer's Termina-
tion of an "At Will" Employment Relationship: A Possible Solution to the Economic
Imbalance in the Employer-Employee Relationship, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 743 (1979);
Note, A Common Law Action for the Abusively Discharged Employee, 26 HASTINGS
L.J. 1435 (1975); Note, A Remedy for the Discharge of Professional Employees Who
Refuse to Perform Unethical or Illegal Acts: A Proposal in Aid of Professional Ethics,
28 VAND. L. REV. 805 (1975); Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN.
L. REV. 335 (1974).
limitations statute to be applied will follow.
Discharges in Violation of Public Policy
Substantive Law and Underlying Policies
As a general proposition, many states have accepted the notion
that a discharge of an at-will employee in violation of public policy is
actionable. 100 These discharges, often termed "retaliatory" or "abu-
sive," 10' have been recognized as unlawful not so much to protect the
interests of individual employees as to effectuate public policy. 102
100. Courts accepting the principle in some form include: Tameny v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980); Sheets v.
Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980); Parnar v. American
Hotels, Inc., 65 Hawaii 370, 652 P.2d 625 (1982); Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist.,
98 Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54 (1977); Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 II1. 2d
124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297
N.E.2d 425 (1973); Murphy v. City of Topeka, 6 Kan. App. 2d 488, 630 P.2d 186
(1981); Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981); Sucho-
dolski v. Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 412 Mich. 692, 316 N.W.2d 710 (1982); Sventko v.
Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976); Keneally v. Orgain, 186 Mont.
1, 606 P.2d 127 (1980); Hansen v. Harrah's, 100 Nev. 60, 675 P.2d 394 (1984); Cloutier
v. Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co., 121 N.H. 915, 436 A.2d 1140 (1981); Pierce v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210,
536 P.2d 512 (1975); Hauck v. Sabine Pilots, Inc., 672 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. Ct. App.
1984); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 162 W. Va. 116, 246 S.E.2d 270 (1978); Shanholtz
v. Monogalhela Power Co., 270 S.E.2d 178 (W. Va. 1980); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Brad-
street, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983).
Several courts, in dicta, have indicated receptiveness to the doctrine. See Larsen v.
Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907 (1977); Gaulden v. Emerson Elec. Co.,
284 Ark. 149, 680 S.W.2d 92 (1984); Abrisz v. Pulley Freight Lines, 270 N.W.2d 454
(Iowa 1978); Larrabee v. Penobscot Frozen Foods, 486 A.2d 97 (Me. 1984); Todd v.
South Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 283 S.C. 155, 321 S.E.2d 602 (1984); Hud-
son v. Zenith Engraving Co., 273 S.C. 766, 259 S.E.2d 812 (1979). But see Ludwick v.
This Minute of Carolina, Inc., 283 S.C. 149, 321 S.E.2d 618 (1984), cert. granted, 285
S.C. 85, 328 S.E.2d 480 (1985).
Cases refusing to embrace the doctrine include: Garcia v. Aetna Fin. Co., 752 F.2d
488 (10th Cir. 1984) (applying Colorado law); Phillips v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
651 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying both Georgia and Texas law); Amos v. Corpo-
ration of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 594 F.
Supp. 791 (C.D. Utah 1984) (applying Utah law); Meeks v. Opp Cotton Mills, Inc., 459
So. 2d 814 (Ala. 1984); Deamrco v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., 384 So. 2d 1253 (Fla.
1980); Georgia Power Co. v. Busbin, 242 Ga. 612, 250 S.E.2d 442 (1978); Kelly v.
Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So. 2d 874 (Miss. 1981); Murphy v. American Home
Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983); Dockery v.
Lampart Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 293, 244 S.E.2d 272 (1978); Currey v. Lone Star
Steel Co., 676 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
101. See Savodnik v. Korvettes, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 822, 825 (E.D.N.Y. 1980);
Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 432, 36 n.2, 432 A.2d 464, 467 n.2 (1984).
102. Garibaldi v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367, (9th Cir. 1984); Messenger v.
Volkswagen of America, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 565 (S.D.W. Va. 1984); Palmateer v. Inter-
national Harvester Co., 85 I11. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981); Harless v. First Nat'l
Bank, 162 W. Va. 116, 246 S.E.2d 270 (1978). But see Parnar v. Americana Hotels,
Inc., 65 Hawaii 370, 652 P.2d 625 (1982); Mallor, supra note 68, at 489 ("Fundamen-
tally, however, the objective of [all theories] is to correct the imbalance of power which
results from the practical inability of unorganized employees to bargain individually for
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The Oregon Supreme Court typifies judicial efforts to distinguish the
discharge that offends public policy and the discharge resulting
purely from a personal dispute. In Delaney v. Taco Time Interna-
tional,0 3 the court identified three types of wrongful discharge
claims: those in violation of some socially important public policy;
those in retaliation for the employee's exercise of some personal stat-
utory employment right; and those in retaliation for the employee's
exercise of a purely personal right unsupported by a socially impor-
tant public policy. 04 This mode of distinction may prove unwork-
able,105 but it highlights the continuing struggle to avert total erosion
of the at-will doctrine.
Many jurisdictions characterize wrongful discharge as tortious,
thereby authorizing a possible award of punitive damages. 06 A key
problem is identifying the nature and source of public policy which
supports the cause of action. In an early and influential California
case, Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,07 pub-
lic policy was defined as "that principle of law which holds that no
citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to
the public or against the public good."' 0 8 In Petermann, the court
job security.").
103. 297 Or. 10, 681 P.2d 114 (1984).
104. Delaney cited Campbell v. Ford Indus., Inc., 274 Or. 243 546 P.2d 141
(1976), as an example in which it was held that an employee fired for exercising his
statutory right to inspect corporate records did not have a cause of action. In McQuary
v. Bel Air Convalescent Home, 69 Or. App. 107, 684 P.2d 21 (1984), reporting violations
of laws regulating nursing homes was deemed an "important societal obligation." See
also Burgess v. Chicago Sun-Times, 132 111. App. 3d 181, 476 N.E.2d 1284, (1985);
Rice v. Grant County Bd. of Comm'rs, 472 N.E.2d 213 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984); Larrabee
v. Penobscot Frozen Foods, Inc., 486 A.2d 97, 100 (Me. 1984).
105. Such a distinction is criticized in Comment, Protecting Employees at Will
Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1931,
1948-50 (1983).
106. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 839 (1980); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 I11. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978) (pro-
spective); Hansen v. Harrah's, 100 Nev. 60, 675 P.2d 394 (1984) (same); Nees v. Hocks,
272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975); Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co., 677 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn.
1984). But see Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834
(1983) (public policy exception permitted on contract theory only); Yartzoff v. Demo-
crat-Herald Publishing Co., 281 Or. 651 n.1, 576 P.2d 356 n.1 (1978); see also Hicks v.
Tulsa Dynaspan, Inc., 695 P.2d 17 (Okla. Ct. App. 1985) (punitive damages are availa-
ble for violation of wrongful discharge statute). The significance of a punitive damage
award is particularly important in cases in which actual damages are minimal, as when
the employee has obtained another job. Hicks, 695 P.2d at 19. See generally Mallor,
supra note 68.
107. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
108. Id. at 188, 344 P.2d at 27 (quoting Safeway Stores v. Retail Clerks Int'l
Ass'n, 41 Cal. 2d 567, 575, 261 P.2d 721, 726 (1953)).
permitted an at-will employee to sue his employer after he was ter-
minated for refusing to commit perjury at the insistence of the em-
ployer. The California Supreme Court approved the Petermann deci-
sion and language in the seminal case of Tameny v. Atlantic
Richfield Co.'09 Tameny recognized the public policy exception and
applied it to a situation in which an employee was terminated for
refusing to engage in his employer's price fixing scheme in violation
of antitrust laws.
The broad language suggests that the courts will define appropri-
ate public policies for which a retaliatory discharge is unlawful.
Most courts, however, have been hesitant to engage in such judicial
activism, a reluctance which reflects the perception that the at-will
doctrine serves some useful purpose,110 and a sense that the legisla-
ture is the more appropriate body to declare public policy. 11 Some
of this hesitation flows from the fact that the at-will doctrine may be
embodied in statute.1 2 An overly broad view, which eventually
would lead to the result that an at-will termination is itself contrary
to public policy, is not embraced by courts sensitive to these re-
straints.11  This has led some courts to conclude that they have no
power to declare public policy in this area.1 4
109. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).
110. See Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d
86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983); Whittaker v. Care-Mqre, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 395, 396
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1981) ("[T]he very foundation of the free enterprise system could be
jeopardized" by recognition of the public policy exception); Stanley v. Sewell Coal Co.,
285 S.E.2d 679, 684 (W.Va. 1981) (Neely, J., dissenting) (describing the public policy
exception as bent upon a "morbid, Grendel-like rampage through our economic system").
Il1. Martin v. Platt, 179 Ind. App. 688, 386 N.E.2d 1206 (1979); Murphy v.
American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232
(1983). In some instances judicial inaction has prompted legislative action. The Alabama
Legislature provided a statutory cause of action for retaliatory discharge for jury service
after such a claim was rejected in Bender Ship Repair, Inc. v. Stevens, 379 So. 2d 594
(Ala. 1980). See also 1984 N.Y. Laws ch. 660 (effective September 1, 1984), providing a
discharge remedy for "whistleblowing" employees in response to the refusal of the New
York Court of Appeals to recognize the public policy exception in Murphy. Other states
recently have enacted whistleblowing statutes. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-
51m (West Supp. 1985); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. 99 15.361-.369 (West 1981); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 230.80 (West 1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.65 (West 1985). Some stat-
utes protect only public employees. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, 1 63bl19c.1
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); 1984 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 301; N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1984); TEx. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-16a (Vernon Supp. 1985); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 42.40.050 (West Supp. 1985). The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico protects
employees against discharges without just cause. P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 29, §§ 185a-185i
(Supp, 1983).
112. E.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West 1971); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-503
(1983). See Crenshaw v. Bozeman Deaconess Hosp., 693 P.2d 487 (Mont. 1984). This
may be more of an objection when the public policy cannot be found in statute.
113. See Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 477 n.5,
199 Cal. Rptr. 613, 618 n.5 (1984) (approving trial court's order).
114. See Martin v. Platt, 179 Ind. App. 688, 386 N.E. 2d 1026 (1979); Shapiro v.
Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613 (1984) (citing,
as an example, Mallard v. Boring, 182 Cal. App. 2d 390, 6 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1960)). The
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In most jurisdictions that have accepted the public policy excep-
tion, the policy itself must be embodied in a statute.11 5 The difficulty
with identifying a legislative expression of public policy is that, to
the extent that the legislature has expressed its views in a statute,
the implementation of statutory policy commonly is imperfect be-
cause no remedy for retaliatory discharge is provided.11  Indeed, in
those situations in which the legislature has provided a remedy for
the discharged employee, the employee may be precluded from pur-
suing a common law remedy.117
holding in Mallard, that an at-will employee could be terminated for serving on a jury,
undoubtedly is no longer good law in light of Tameny's approval of Petermann. See
supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text. In any event, the Mallard court did not state
that courts have no power to declare public policy in the absence of statute; rather, the
court chose to defer to the legislature in the enactment of a uniform public policy involv-
ing jury service. Mallard, 182 Cal. App. 2d at 394, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 174-75. Such a
statute subsequently was enacted. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 230 (West 1971). It also is
worth noting that in other contexts courts have not been so reluctant to declare public
policy. See, e.g., Altschul v. Sayble, 83 Cal. App. 3d 153, 147 Cal. Rptr. 716 (1978).
115. See Martin v. Platt, 179 Ind. App. 688, 386 N.E.2d 1026 (1979); Rice v.
Grant County Bd. of Comm'rs, 472 N.E.2d 213 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984). This approach is
approved in Note, Limiting the Right to Terminate At-Will - Have the Courts Forgotten
the Employer?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 201 (1982). Some courts require that the public policy
be specific, not general. See Lampe v. Presbyterian Medical Center, 41 Colo. App. 465,
590 P.2d 513 (1978); Corbin v. Sinclair Mktg., Inc., 684 P.2d 265 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984)
(policy embodied in state occupational safety act too broad).
116. Certain jurisdictions do provide a statutory remedy to a discharged employee
when the discharge violates a statute. Examples include: remedies for a discharge in
response to the exercise of political activities, CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102 (West 1971);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-108 (1973); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 56, § 33 (West 1975);
NEv. REV. STAT. § 613.040 (1983); N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 107(1)(McKinney 1973);
jury service, CAL. LAB. CODE § 230 (West 1971); IDAHO CODE § 2-218 (1979); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268, § 14A (West 1970); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 519 (McKinney Supp.
1985); wage garnishment, CAL LAB. CODE § 2929 (West Supp. 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 48, 1 39.11 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 5252 (McKinney
1978); exercising rights under the workers' compensation laws, CAL. LAB. CODE § 132a
(West Supp. 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, % 138.4 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 176.82 (West Supp. 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.780 (Vernon Supp.
1985); discrimination, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940 (West Supp. 1985); D.C. CODE § 1-
2515 (1981); N.Y. ExEc. LAW §§ 290-301 (McKinney 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 296.020
(Vernon Supp. 1985); exercise of rights under toxic substances disclosure laws, ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 48, 1 1414(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. I 11 F, §
13 (West Supp. 1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:5A-17 (West Supp. 1985).
117. The age discrimination provisions of the California Fair Employment and
Housing Act have been held to constitute an exclusive remedy for wrongful discharge on
the basis of age. Mahoney v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 571 F. Supp. 287 (N.D. Cal. 1983)
(applying California law); Strauss v. A.L. Randal Co., 144 Cal. App. 3d 514, 194 Cal.
Rptr. 520 (1983); accord Bruffet v. Warner Communications, Inc., 692 F.2d 910 (3d
Cir. 1982) (age-applying Pennsylvania law); Schroeder v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 448 F.
Supp. 910 (E.D. Mich. 1977), modified, 456 F. Supp. 650 (E.D. Mich. 1978)(sex/age);
Fischer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 107 Idaho 197, 687 P.2d 587 (1984)(age); Dykstra v.
Crestwood Bank, 117 II1. App. 3d 821, 454 N.E.2d 51, (1983)(age); Melley v. Gillete
Courts have recognized a public policy in a statute that encour-
ages the activity for which the employee was terminated." 8 More-
over, some jurisdictions have been willing to go further and recog-
nize a public policy embodied in a statute which provides the source
of a duty breached by the employer in situations where the employee
"blows the whistle." 1 9 Fairly well accepted is the public policy
found in a statute making unlawful any activity in which the em-
ployee refused to engage at the insistence of the employer. 20 Courts
Corp., 19 Mass. App. 511, 475 N.E.2d 1227 (1985) (age); Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co.,
120 N.H. 295, 414 A.2d 1273 (1980)(age); Dillon v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc., 43
Md. App. 161, 403 A.2d 406 (1979) (handicap); Ohlson v. DST Indus., Inc., IIl Mich.
App. 580, 314 N.W.2d 699 (1981)(unsafe working conditions). But see Cancellier v.
Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1982) (applying California law) (age);
Wynn v. Boeing Military Airplane Co., 595 F. Supp. 727 (D. Kan. 1984) (applying
Kansas law) (race); Hentzel v. Singer Co., 138 Cal. App. 3d 290, 188 Cal. Rptr. 159
(1982)(Cal-OSHA violations); Lally v. Copygraphics, 85 N.J. 668, 428 A.2d 1317
(1978)(exercising rights under workers' compensation laws); Holien v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 298 Or. 76, 689 P.2d 1292 (1984)(sex).
Federal law may preempt wrongful discharge claims. See Magnuson v. Burlington
Northern, Inc., 576 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1978) (Railway Labor Act); Johnson v. Trans-
world Airlines, Inc., 149 Cal. App. 3d 518, 196 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1983)(ERISA); Witkow-
ski v. St. Anne's Hosp., Inc., 113 Ill. App. 3d 745, 447 N.E.2d 1016 (1983)(ERISA);
Anco Constr. Co. v. Freeman, 236 Kan. 626, 693 P.2d 1183 (1983)(NLRB jurisdiction).
But see Garibaldi v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984) (Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act); Thomas v. Kroger Co., 583 F. Supp. 1031 (S.D. W. Va. 1984) (no
preemption by Labor Management Relations Act); Mungo v. UTA French Airlines, 166
Cal. App. 3d 327, 212 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1985) (no preemption by Railway Labor Act); cf.
Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977)
(intentional infliction of emotional distress claim not preempted by National Labor Rela-
tions Act).
118. Cases implicating such statutes involve dismissals of employees engaging in
activities affirmatively protected by statute, including serving on a jury, see Nees v.
Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa.
Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978), exercising constitutional rights of free speech, see
Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983) (applying Pennsylvania
law); Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Hawaii 370, 652 P.2d 625 (1982), exercising
rights under workers' compensation laws, see Smith v. Piezo Technology & Professional
Adm'rs, 427 So.2d 182 (Fla. 1983); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 II1. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d
353 (1978); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973);
Firestone Textile Co. Div. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1983); Sventko v. Kroger,
69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976); Hansen v. Harrah's, 100 Nev. 60, 675 P.2d
394 (1984); Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co., 677 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn. 1984); see also Darnell
v. Impact Indus., Inc., 105 Ill. 2d 158, 473 N.E.2d 935 (1984) (workers' compensation
claim against former employer), refusing to take a polygraph test where statute made
such a requirement a misdemeanor, see Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d
1363 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying Pennsylvania law), and working in dangerous conditions,
see Hentzel v. Singer Co., 138 Cal. App. 3d 290, 188 Cal. Rptr. 159 (1982); Cloutier v.
Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 121 N.H. 915, 436 A.2d 1140 (1981).
119. See Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Hawaii 370, 652 P.2d 625 (1982);
Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 I11. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981); Mc-
Quary v. Bel Air Convalescent Home, Inc., 69 Or. App. 107, 684 P.2d 21 (1984). Sev-
eral states have statutes protecting whistleblowers in various situations. See statutes cited
supra note 111.
120. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330,
164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980); Petermann v. International Bd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App.
2d 184, 344 P.2d 25, 29 Cal. Rptr. 399 (1959); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc.,
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also have found sufficient expressions of public policy in the federal
constitution or laws,121 in state constitutions, 122 administrative regu-
lations,12 3 local ordinances124 and codes of professional conduct.125
Little recognition exists of judicially-created public policy totally
unsupported by statute. 26 More typical is the refusal to declare a
public policy in favor of such things as "humanity and common de-
cency", and a deference to the employer's business judgment in
choosing employees. 28 To the extent that the wrongful discharge
179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980); Trombetta v. Detroit, T. & I. Ry., 81 Mich. App.
489, 265 N.W.2d 385 (1978); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 160 N.J. Super.
335, 399 A.2d 1023 (1979); O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 N.J. Super. 416, 390 A.2d 149
(1978); see also Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1984) (applying
Arkansas law).
121. See Adler v. American Standard Corp., 538 F. Supp. 572 (D. Md. 1982);
McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 111 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Daniel v. Magma Copper
Co., 127 Ariz. 320, 620 P.2d 699 (1980); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d
167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980); Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65
Hawaii 370, 652 P.2d 625 (1982); Hauck v. Sabine Pilots, Inc., 672 S.W.2d 322 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1984); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 162 W. Va. 116, 246 S.E.2d 270 (1978).
But see Anco Constr. Co. v. Freeman, 236 Kan. 626, 693 P.2d 1183 (1985) (wrongful
discharge claim protects only state law interests).
122. Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983)(applying Penn-
sylvania law); Delaney v. Taco Time Int'l, 297 Or. 10, 681 P.2d 114 (1984).
123. Nye v. Department of Livestock, 196 Mont. 222, 639 P.2d 498 (1982); Pierce
v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980).
124. Gould v. Campbell's Ambulance Serv., Inc., 130 Ill. App. 3d 598, 474 N.E.2d
740 (1984).
125. Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980); Kal-
man v. Grand Union Co., 183 N.J. Super. 153, 443 A.2d 728 (1982). But see Suchodol-
ski v. Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 412 Mich. 692, 316 N.W.2d 710 (1982).
126. But perhaps "an ingenious lawyer can nearly always find a right 'implicit in a
statute.'" Firestone Textile Co. Div. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730, 734 (Ky. 1983) (Ste-
phenson, J., dissenting). Some jurisdictions have recognized the possibility of judicially-
created public policy. See Ring v. River Walk Manor, Inc., 596 F. Supp. 393 (D. Md.
1984) (remanded to state court for determination of public policy); Palmateer v. Interna-
tional Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981); Adler v. American Stan-
dard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981); Cloutier v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.,
121 N.H. 915, 436 A.2d 1140 (1981).
127. See Larsen v. Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1977); Ising v. Barnes Hosp., 674 S.W.2d 623 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Pierce v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980) (personal morality). Yet inquir-
ing into the social importance of the public policy alleged, as sanctioned in Delaney v.
Taco Time Int'l, 297 Or. 10, 681 P.2d 114 (1984), may involve a similar type of judicial
interventionism.
128. Sheriff v. Revell, Inc., 165 Cal. App. 3d 297, 211 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1985);
Keneally v. Orgain, 186 Mont. 1, 606 P.2d 127 (1980); see also Thompson v. St. Regis
Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984) (en banc). This approach is sug-
gested in Note, Defining Public Policy Torts in At Will Dismissals, 34 STAN. L. REV.
153, 171 (1981). Nevertheless, in Crosier v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 150 Cal. App. 3d
1132, 1140, 198 Cal. Rptr. 361, 366 (1983), a suit for wrongful discharge brought under
breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the court rejected the creation
remedy effectuates underlying public policy, the law in this area en-
larges civil remedies for violations of statutorily-expressed policies.
This remedy is similar to implying private causes of action for viola-
tion of statute.129 Viewed from this perspective, the wrongful dis-
charge claim appears to be a creature of statute.
Choice of a Statute of Limitations
Although the relationship between employer and employee is cre-
ated by contract, the employer's obligation not to terminate the em-
of a business judgment defense for the employer, stating that it would preclude review of
the employer's reasons for the discharge and would permit the employer to be the "sole
judge and final arbiter" of the propriety of the discharge.
129. The ascertainment of legislative intent is the primary focus of an inquiry re-
garding implied remedy. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
Indications of intent may be determined by examining whether the plaintiff represents a
class for whose benefit the statute was enacted, whether evidence exists of explicit or
implicit legislative intent to create such a remedy, whether implication of a remedy is
consistent with the underlying legislative scheme, and whether an adequate remedy al-
ready is provided. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The Cort analysis has been
followed in a number of jurisdictions. See Sawyer Realty Group, Inc. v. Jarvis Corp., 89
Ill. 2d 379, 432 N.E.2d 849 (1982); Seeman v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 322 N.W.2d 35
(Iowa 1982); Larrabee v. Penobscot Frozen Foods, Inc., 486 A.2d 97 (Me. 1984); Burns
Jackson Miller Summit and Spitzer v. Lindner, 59 N.Y.2d 314, 451 N.E.2d 459, 464
N.Y.S.2d 712 (1983). See generally Note, Implied Causes of Action in the State
Courts, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1243 (1978).
Despite the similarity of the implied remedy issue to that of creating a "common law"
claim for wrongful discharge in violation of a legislative public policy, courts have not
employed such a structured approach in wrongful discharge cases. Many have considered
the availability of other remedies. See Shanahan v. WITI-TV, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 219,
224-25 (E.D. Wis. 1982); McCluney v. Joseph Schiltz Brewing Co., 489 F. Supp. 24, 26-
27 (E.D. Wis. 1980); Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 438 F. Supp. 1052, 1055-56 (E.D. Pa.
1977), af'd, 619 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1980); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind.
249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973). Consideration of the importance or specificity of the public
policy in question may be a form of inquiry similar to asking whether the legislation is
designed to protect the class of which plaintiff is a member. See supra note 115. Com-
pare Yanta v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 66 Wis. 2d 53, 61, 224 N.W.2d 389, 394
(analogizing creation of claim for wrongful discharge in violation of sex discrimination
law to concept of negligence per se based on violation of statute); Lally v. Copygraphics,
173 N.J. Super. 162, 413 A.2d 960 (1980), affid, 85 N.J. 668, 428 A.2d 1317 (1981)
(applying the Second Restatement of Torts section 874A concerning torts based on viola-
tion of statute to discharge for exercising rights under workers' compensation laws);
Smith v. Pieza Technology & Professional Adm'rs, 427 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1983) (implied
cause of action for wrongful discharge in retaliation for pursuing workers' compensation
remedy); Cooke v. Optimum/Ideal Managers, Inc., 130 Ill. App. 3d 180, 473 N.E.2d
334 (1984) (remedy not implied under workers' compensation laws for interference with
employee's statutory right to receive copies of medical reports); Stepanisehen v.
Merchants Despatch Trans. Corp., 722 F.2d 922, 925-27 (1st Cir. 1983) (applying Cort
principles to find implied remedy for discharge in violation of federal Railway Labor
Act).
One federal court has approved a claim for discharge in violation of public policy in a
case in which the state's highest court had held that no implied civil remedy existed for
violation of the statute embodying the public policy. McKinney v. National Dairy, 491 F.
Supp. 1108, 1122 (D. Mass. 1980). The court stated that the state court case had been
decided prior to recognition of the public policy exception to the at-will doctrine. McKin-
ney, 491 F. Supp. at 1121-22.
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ployee in violation of public policy does not stem from the contract.
This obligation is recognized in Shanholtz v. Monongahela Power
Co.,130 in which the Supreme Court of West Virginia ruled that the
contract statute of limitations was inapplicable to a claim for wrong-
ful discharge. The employee alleged that he was terminated for his
efforts to obtain workers' compensation benefits. The court distin-
guished prior case law holding that the longer contract statute could
be applied to claims based either on contract or on tort. The court
stated that:
[H]ere there was no manner in which the alleged contract of employment
could be breached by termination thereof. Either party could terminate the
at-will employment with or without cause and no cause of action would
accrue. Only by a tortious act could a cause of action accrue to the plaintiff.
The wrong done, if any, is not the act of discharging the plaintiff (the em-
ployer had that right under the alleged at-will employment contract), but
the act of contravening public policy in carrying out such discharge.
131
Because no contractual obligation is breached,3 2 and because the
courts are obliged to give some weight to the distinction between
contract and tort customarily found in statutes of limitation, it
makes sense not to use a contract statute. This conclusion also makes
sense when a remedy is considered. Many states approve an award of
emotional distress damages for breach of contract if such damages
are foreseeable from the nature of the contract.'3 3 Such damages are
a likely result of a wrongful discharge.'s Nonetheless, in cases in
130. 270 S.E.2d 178 (W. Va. 1980).
131. Id. at 182; accord Scott v. Union Tank Car Co., 402 N.E.2d 992 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1980); see also Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367, 1375 (9th
Cir. 1984); Shaeffer v. General Motors Corp., 586 F. Supp. 870, 873 n.1 (E.D. Mich.
1984); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 16 W. Va. 116, 246 S.E.2d 270 (1978). In Newfield
v. Insurance Co. of the West, 156 Cal. App. 3d 440, 203 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1984), the court
held without discussion, and in apparent dicta, that the California one-year personal in-
jury statute would apply to a claim for discharge in violation of public policy. And in
Daniele v. Fesco Div. of Cities Serv. Co., 733 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam), the
court held in a brief opinion that the California two-year statute of limitations for tor-
tious invasions of property interests applied to a wrongful discharge claim. The Daniele
court did not identify the factual basis for the wrongful discharge claims, and it offered
no reason for its choice of the two-year statute. See also Arvie v. Century Tele. Enter.,
Inc., 452 So. 2d 392 (La. App. 1984) (one-year tort statute applied); Henon v. Lever
Bros. Co., 114 I11. App. 3d 608, 449 N.E.2d 196 (1983) (residual statute applied to
wrongful discharge claims characterized as a tort arising out of a contract).
132. The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may be violated by a
discharge in violation of public policy. See infra notes 157-62 and accompanying text.
Such a claim is characterized by both contract and tort elements, but since the violation
of public policy is crucial to the successful assertion of the cause of action, the claim
should be analyzed as a straight public policy discharge case.
133. See cases cited supra note 67.
134. Cf. Valentine v. General Am. Credit, Inc., 123 Mich. App. 521, 332 N.W.2d
which the employment relationship is at-will, it cannot be said that
the employer contracted with the foresight that he would have to
compensate the employee for emotional distress upon termination.
What makes the termination wrongful, and generates the emotional
distress, is the breach of the obligation not to offend public policy.
This makes the emotional distress appear less the result of a contract
breach than the result of an intentional tort.135
Moreover, the availability of punitive damages for discharge in vi-
olation of public policy makes application of a contract statute of
limitations to such a claim unjustifiable not only as a matter of re-
medial policy but also as a matter of judicial restraint. To endow a
claim for punitive damages brought under the public policy excep-
tion with a contract statute of limitations would undermine the pre-
sumed legislative policy that social stability is achieved by giving a
shorter life to tort claims.
The problem is not solved once a contract statute of limitations
has been rejected. A further choice must be made between a tort
statute of limitations and the limitations period for actions "based on
statute." This question arises because of the adherence to the re-
quirement that the discharge violate a public policy of legislative
creation. To the extent that the wrongful discharge remedy affords
an additional enforcement mechanism for the effectuation of that
policy, the liability is indeed "based on statute." The issue is acute in
591 (1983) (claim for emotional distress rejected); Yanta v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
66 Wis. 2d 53, 224 N.W.2d 389 (1974) (discharged plaintiff's recovery limited to lost
wages because aggravated circumstances insufficiently alleged).
135. A personal injury tort statute of limitations has been applied to causes of
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Christman v. American Cyana-
mid Co., 578 F. Supp. 63 (N.D. W. Va. 1983) (applying West Virginia law); Rodgers v.
Pennsylvania Life Ins. Co., 539 F. Supp. 879 (S.D. Iowa 1982) (applying Iowa law);
Bruffett v. Warner Communications, Inc., 534 F. Supp. 375, 377 (E.D. Pa. 1982), afrd,
692 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 1982) (applying Pennsylvania law); McDowell v. Union Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 404 F. Supp. 136 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (applying California law); Hanson v. Stoll,
130 Ariz. 454, 636 P.2d 1236 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981); Scannell v. County of Riverside,
152 Cal. App. 3d 596, 199 Cal. Rptr. 644 (1984); Goldner v. Sullivan, Gough,
Skipworth, Summers & Smith, 105 A.D.2d 1149, 482 N.Y.S.2d 606 (1984).
Other courts have rejected application of the personal injury statute. See Craft v. Rice,
671 S.W.2d 247 (Ky. 1984); Campos v. Oldsmobile Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 71 Mich.
App. 23, 246 N.W.2d 352 (1976); Yeager v. Local Union 20, 6 Ohio St. 3d 369, 453
N.E.2d 666 (1983) (governed by residual statute, not enumerated tort statute); Williams
v. Lee Way Motor Freight, 688 P.2d 1294 (Okla. 1984) (same).
There is some suggestion that the emotional distress claim is not separate from a bad
faith claim. See Burda v. National Ass'n of Postal Supervisors, 592 F. Supp. 273
(D.D.C. 1984) (emotional distress so intertwined with other claims that statute of limita-
tions applicable to latter applies to former as well); Purdy v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 157
Cal. App. 3d 59, 203 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1984); Richardson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 117 Cal.
App. 3d 8, 172 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1981) (emotional distress damages for bad faith acts of
insurer as an aggravation of financial damages and not a separate cause of action); see
also McDowell, 404 F. Supp. at 147 n.8. But see Mosley v. Federals Dep't Stores, Inc.,
85 Mich. App. 333, 271 N.W.2d 224 (1978); Carsner v. Freightliner Corp., 69 Or. App.
666, 688 P.2d 398 (1984).
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jurisdictions such as California in which limitations periods for lia-
bility based on statute are more hospitable than the tort or implied
contract statutes.
Applying the rule that the "based on statute" limitations period
governs only claims unknown at common law would not eliminate its
applicability to a public policy exception discharge claim, a claim
rejected at common law. The applicable question is whether the lia-
bility, which is determined to be appropriate as a matter of public
policy, is sufficiently "based on statute" in a situation in which the
statute is silent as to such liability. The choice is between treating
the claim as an intentional tort, with the statute merely providing
the source of the duty, or treating it as a cause of action implied
from the statute. Viewing the discharge remedy as merely a judi-
cially-devised remedy for a liability already embodied by statute
would support application of the longer statute of limitations.
This approach appears sensible considering the purpose for per-
mitting recovery in such discharge cases. That purpose primarily is
not to protect the employee but to effectuate public policy. Applying
the "based on statute" period to such claims does not appear incon-
sistent nor seem unfair to employees not terminated in violation of
public policy.'36 Rather, the rights of the employee terminated in
violation of public policy seem similar to those of individuals harmed
in other ways, by statutory violations, who are provided a statutory
remedy and a hospitable limitations period.
Applying the "based on statute" rationale is appropriate if the ra-
tionale supports legislative preference for suits vindicating statutory
policies. In jurisdictions willing to recognize a cause of action for
136. A separate issue is posed by the situation in which the statute articulating
public policy provides remedies and a special limitations period. Even if the discharged
plaintiff is not an individual given a remedy, a question arises whether a special limita-
tions period should apply to the discharge cause of action in order to achieve remedial
consistency in enforcing the particular statute in question. In Davis v. Potomac Elec.
Power Co., 449 A.2d 278 (D.D.C. 1982), the one-year limitations period for filing an
administrative complaint with the District of Columbia Office of Human Rights was held
applicable to a civil claim as well, on grounds that the impermanent nature of evidence
and the need to promote rapid compliance with the Act justified this result. However,
this approach was rejected in Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293,
448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983), in which the New York Court of Appeals
ruled that both the difference between administrative proceedings and adjudication and
the indicated desirability of staggered time periods indicated a legislative intent to not
fhave the administrative limitations period applied to civil suits under the Human Rights
Law.
If the plaintiff is given a remedy by the statute, he or she may be prohibited from
asserting a common law discharge claim. See supra note 117.
discharge in violation of a judicially-created public policy, such
claims will resemble bad faith discharge claims as courts develop
policies supporting the cause of action. The choice of a limitations
statute for such claims presents problems similar to the choice of a
statute for discharges in breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing discussed below.
Discharge as a Breach of Implied-in-Fact Contract
Substantive Law and Underlying Policies
In cases in which no express promise by the employer to terminate
the employee only for cause exists, the facts and circumstances of
the relationship nevertheless may give rise to the implication that the
employer did in fact make such a promise. This principle stems from
the traditional contract notion of implied-in-fact promises.131 To the
extent that the implied contract principle recognizes that parties to
an employment contract may modify what otherwise would be an at-
will arrangement to provide for termination only for cause, the pur-
pose of giving effect to the agreement is simply that it effectuates the
intent of the parties. In this sense, the purpose of recognizing the
"exception" to the at-will doctrine, if it is an exception, is the con-
tract law principle of recognition and enforcement of private party
agreement, and specifically, protection of the employee's rights under
the agreement.
Some courts require that the employee show "independent consid-
eration" for the employer's implied promise to terminate only for
cause.1 38 The modern view, however, is that such a requirement
serves only an evidentiary function-a function that also can be
served by examining the relationship. 139 An allied theory is the use
of personnel policies and manuals to locate the source of a promise
to terminate the employee only for cause.
1 40
137. See Gianaculas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 761 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1985)
(applying California law); Steed v. Busby, 268 Ark. 1, 593 S.W.2d 34 (1980); Weitzen-
korn v. Lesser, 40 Cal. 2d 778, 256 P.2d 947 (1953); Allegri v. Providence-St. Margaret
Health Center, 9 Kan. App. 2d 659, 684 P.2d 1031 (1984); Bell v. Hegewald, 95 Wash.
2d 686, 628 P.2d 1305 (1981); Kramer v. Hayward, 57 Wis. 2d 302, 203 N.W.2d 871
(1973). See generally A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 18 (1963); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 (1981).
138. See Page v. Carolina Coach Co., 667 F.2d 1156 (4th Cir. 1982) (applying
Maryland law); Price v. Mercury Supply Co., 682 S.W.2d 924 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).
139. Eales v. Tanana Valley Medical-Surgical Group, Inc., 663 P.2d 958, 959
(Alaska 1983); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917
(1981); see also Allegri v. Providence-St. Margaret Health Center, 9 Kan. App. 2d 659,
684 P.2d 1031 (1984); Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 15 Ohio App. 3d 1, 472 N.E.2d 765
(1984).
140. See Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983) (applying
Pennsylvania law); Greene v. Howard Univ., 412 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Brooks v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 805 (D. Colo. 1983); Chamberlain v. Bissell,
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In Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc.,41 the California Court of Appeal,
rejecting the "independent consideration" requirement, enumerated
various factors which indicate that an employment contract contains
an implied agreement to terminate only for cause. Such factors in-
clude personnel policies and practices of the employer, the em-
ployee's longevity of service, actions or communications by the em-
ployer reflecting assurances of continued employment, and practices
of the industry involved.
142
In Pugh, an employee, who began work for See's Candies as a
dishwasher in 1941 and who advanced over a period of thirty-two
years to the position of vice-president in charge of production, was
told to "look deep within [himself]" for the reasons for his termina-
tion. The court ruled that the plaintiff stated a claim for breach of
Inc., 547 F. Supp. 1067 (W.D. Mich. 1982) (applying Michigan law); Wagner v. Sperry
Univac, Div. of Sperry Rand Corp., 458 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Pa. 1978), affd, 624 F.2d
1092 (3d Cir. 1980); Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hosp., 141 Ariz. 544, 688
P.2d 170 (1984); Walker v. Northern San Diego County Hosp. Dist., 135 Cal. App. 3d
896, 185 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1982); Salimi v. Farmers Ins. Group, 684 P.2d 264 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1984); Falls v. Lawnwood Medical Center, 427 So. 2d 361 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983); Carter v. Kaskaskia Community Action Agency, 24 II. App. 3d 1056, 322
N.E.2d 574 (1974); Shah v. American Synthetic Rubber Corp., 655 S.W.2d 489 (Ky.
1983); Dahl v. Brunswick Corp., 277 Md. 471, 356 A.2d 221 (1976); Toussaint v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980); Pine River State Bank v.
Mettile, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983); Hinkeldey v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 470 S.W.2d
494 (Mo. 1971); Arie v. Intertherm, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 142 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Morris
v. Lutheran Medical Center, 215 Neb. 677, 340 N.W.2d 388 (1983); Southwest Gas
Corp. v. Ahmad, 99 Nev. 594, 668 P.2d 261 (1983); Murphy v. American Home Prods.
Corp.,, 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983); Wiener v. McGraw
Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982); Hammond v.
North Dakota State Personnel Bd., 345 N.W.2d 359 (N.D. 1984); Langdon v. Saga
Corp., 569 P.2d 524 (Okla. Ct. App. 1977); Yartzoff v. Democrat-Herald Publishing
Co., 281 Or. 651, 576 P.2d 356 (1978); Osterkamp v. Alkota Mfg., Inc., 332 N.W.2d
275 (S.D. 1983); Hamby v. Genesco, Inc., 627 S.W.2d 373 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982); Paic-
itelli v. Southern Utah State College, 636 P.2d 1063 (Utah 1981); Thompson v. St. Re-
gis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984) (en bane). But see Beidler v.
W.R. Grace, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1013 (E.D. Pa. 1978), afid, 609 F.2d 500 (3d Cir.
1979) (applying Pennsylvania law); Uriarte v. Perez-Molina, 434 F. Supp. 76 (D.D.C.
1977); White v. Chelsea Indus., Inc., 425 So. 2d 1090 (Ala. 1983); Muller v. Stromberg
Carlson Corp., 427 So. 2d 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Johnson v. National Beef
Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 779 (1976); Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 196
Mont. 178, 638 P.2d 1063 (1982); Edwards v. Citibank, N.A., 100 Misc.2d 59, 418
N.Y.S.2d 269 (1979); Richardson v. Charles Cole Memorial Hosp., 320 Pa. Super. 106,
466 A.2d 1084 (1983).
141. 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981).
142. Id. at 327, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 925; see also Hillsman v. Sutter Community
Hosps., 153 Cal. App. 3d 743, 753, 200 Cal. Rptr. 605, 611 (1984); Walker v. Northern
San Diego County Hosp. Dist., 135 Cal. App. 3d 896, 905, 185 Cal. Rptr. 617, 622
(1982).
an implied-in-fact contract of continued employment. 143 The court
reasoned that a promise was implied from such indications as plain-
tiff's length of employment, the absence of criticism, and indications
of praise from the employer. The court's discussion of the need to
revise the at-will doctrine to reallocate the balance of power in the
employment relationship, coupled with the discussion of plaintiff's
employment history, make it clear that the court was willing to find
an implied promise to protect Pugh's reliance upon his job security.
Thus the implied contract exception can be viewed both as a means
to protect employee reliance, and as a mechanism to redress the bar-
gaining power inequities in the workplace, rather than purely as a
means to enforce agreement reached by mutual consent. This is also
indicated by the fact that length of employment is a critical fac-
tor,144 so that the so-called promise of the employer did not arise at
the commencement of the relationship. In fact, Pugh does not indi-
cate at what point in time the promise does arise. An agreement
seems implied not so much as the result of any clear expressions of
promise, but rather as a result of the employer's conduct causing the
employee to enjoy a feeling of job security.
14 5
These "reliance protection" and "reallocation of bargaining
power" underpinnings of the implied-in-fact contract exception sug-
gest that the courts are imposing a legal obligation upon the em-
ployer, rather than merely giving effect to the intent of the parties.
However, the exception does embody traditional contract notions
such as the rule that the agreement must be interpreted in light of
the reasonable expectations of the parties. The position that the ex-
ception primarily is based upon traditional contract principles is bol-
stered by court rulings that such a cause of action is unavailable to a
143. Nonetheless, the court rejected the public policy theory advanced by the
plaintiff on the ground that the evidence failed to support it. Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d at
324, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 922-24.
144. See Newfield v. Insurance Co. of the West, 156 Cal. App. 3d 440, 203 Cal.
Rptr. 9 (1984) (two years insufficient); Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal.
App. 3d 407, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613 (1984) (three and one half years insufficient); see also
Comerio v. Beatrice Foods Co., 600 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (three years insuffi-
cient under California law); Crain v. Burroughs Corp., 560 F. Supp. 849 (C.D. Cal.
1983) (less than two years insufficient).
145. See Dare v. Montana Petroleum Mktg. Co., 687 P.2d 1015 (Mont. 1984). A
promissory estoppel theory has been suggested as a further alternative to the at-will doc-
trine. Ryan v. J.C. Penney Co., 627 F.2d 836, 838 n.2 (7th Cir. 1980) (applying Indiana
law); McKinney v. National Dairy Council, 491 F. Supp. 1108, 1116-17 (D. Mass. 1980)
(although theory was not presented at trial); Pepsi Cola Gen. Bottlers, Inc. v. Woods,
440 N.E.2d 696 (hId. Ct. App. 1982); Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d
114, 116 (Minn. 1981); But see Rawson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 554 F. Supp. 327 (D.
Colo. 1983). Another form of protection for the employee's reliance may be a fraud
theory. See Brudnicki v. General Elec. Co., 535 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. I11. 1982); DuSesoi v.
United Ref. Co., 540 F. Supp. 1260 (W.D. Pa. 1982)(interpreting both Missouri and
Pennsylvania law). But see Jacobs v. Georgia Pac. Corp., 172 Ga. App. 319, 323 S.E.2d
238 (1984) (fraud claim not allowed as exception to at-will doctrine).
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person hired pursuant to an express agreement of at-will employ-
ment.14 To this extent any purpose of the law in recognizing this
exception is founded upon traditional notions of contract
enforcement.
Choice of a Statute of Limitations
To the extent that the purpose of according the at-will employee a
cause of action for breach of implied contract is to effectuate an
agreement of continued employment, and to the extent that the obli-
gation being enforced was intended by the parties, there seems to be
no objection to applying the statute of limitations for oral or implied-
in-fact agreements.
A plaintiff, relying upon a written employee manual or employer
policy guide as evidence of the promise, may attempt to plead the
longer limitations period often accorded written contract cases. Such
a plaintiff may have difficulty in light of the restrictive view often
taken of written contract lawsuits; many courts indicate that the en-
tire obligation should be contained in the writing in order for the
longer statute of limitations to apply.1
47
146. Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 199 Cal.
Rptr. 613 (1984); see also Gianaculas v. Trans World Airlines, 761 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir.
1985) (applying both California and New York law); Crain v. Burroughs Corp., 560 F.
Supp. 849 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (applying California law); Summers v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 549 F. Supp. 1157 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (applying Michigan law to situation of demo-
tion as well as discharge). But see Stone v. Mission Bay Mortgage Co., 99 Nev. 802, 672
P.2d 629 (1983) (statement on employment application insufficient as a matter of law to
bind employee to its terms).
The public policy exception has been applied to employees covered by collective bar-
gaining agreements, although it is likely the other exceptions to the at-will doctrine
would not apply. Compare Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367, 1373
n.9 (9th Cir. 1984), with Buscemi v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 736 F.2d 1348, 1350
(9th Cir. 1984), and Olguin v. Inspiration Consol. Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir.
1984). See also Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 105 111. 2d 142, 473 N.E.2d 1280
(1984). In Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 105 S. Ct. 1904 (1985), the Supreme Court
ruled that a claim for bad faith handling of a disability insurance claim contained in a
collective bargaining agreement was preempted by the Labor Management Relations
Act. The Court refused to decide whether the Act would preempt a claim for breach of
an independent non-negotiable state-imposed duty which did not create problems of con-
tract interpretation. Allis-Chalmers, 105 S. Ct. at 1914 n.1 1.
147. See Kerston v. Continental Bank, 129 Ariz. 44, 628 P.2d 592 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1981); Weaver v. Watson, 130 I11. App. 3d 563, 474 N.E.2d 759 (1984); Matherly v.
Hanson, 359 N.W.2d 450, 454 (Iowa 1984); Chilson v. Capital Bank, 10 Kan. App. 2d
111, 692 P.2d 406 (1984); Miller v. William A. Smith Constr. Co., 226 Kan. 172, 603
P.2d 602 (1979); Beekman v. Cornhusker Farms, 214 Neb. 418, 333 N.W.2d 918
(1983); Regina Apartments, Inc. v. Village Green, Inc., 60 Ohio App. 2d 345, 397
N.E.2d 420 (1978); National Bank of Commerce v. Preston, 16 Wash. App. 678, 558
P.2d 1372 (1977).
In some states that have a personal injury statute of limitations,
the statute has been applied to a claim for personal injury pleaded
on a contract theory.148 Such rulings are based upon an interpreta-
tion of the legislative intent that the statute applies to all actions for
personal injury. 149 The crucial issue is whether the claim pleaded is
one to redress personal injury, a difficult proposition in a wrongful
discharge case in which both economic and emotional distress dam-
ages are sought. This problem arises more generally in bad faith
cases and is discussed below.
In the absence of an all-inclusive personal injury limitations pe-
riod, a contract statute should be chosen over a tort statute for sev-
eral reasons. First, the obligation assumed by the employer results
from words and conduct of the employer in raising certain reasona-
ble expectations in the employee. Second, to the extent that the tort
statute imposed would provide a shorter limitations period, a shorter
period is not necessary to preserve evidence. Although the memories
of supervisors and co-workers may fade or the witnesses may become
unavailable,150 the requirement of longevity means that evidence will
by definition be old. Also, because the accrual of the-cause of action
most probably occurs at the time the employee learns that he or she
is to be fired, rather than at the time of termination,' 5 the problem
of stale evidence regarding damages is somewhat alleviated. The
availability of emotional distress damages does present a problem,
insofar as the legislature intended the shorter tort statute to apply to
wrongful discharge cases because of the evidentiary problems in-
volved in proving such damages. Nonetheless, there is no reason to
treat the discharged employee any differently from other contract
plaintiffs, considering the willingness of courts to award
noneconomic damages in true breach of contract cases.
148. See, e.g., Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 588 F. Supp. 562, 567 (E.D. Mich.
1984) (discussing breach of implied contract for failure to promote); Cobb v. Mid-Conti-
nent Tel. Serv. Corp., 90 Mich. App. 349, 282 N.W.2d 317 (1979) (discussing a statute
applying to suits for injury to person or property). See also statutes cited supra note 75.
149. See statutes cited supra note 75.
150. See De Malherbe v. International Union of Elevator Constrs., 449 F. Supp.
1335, 1349 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (describing employment discrimination lawsuit). The De
Malherbe court, however, stated that a shorter statute should apply to offset the dangers
of fading memories.
151. See, e.g., Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6 (1981); Daniels v. Fesco Div. of
Cities Serv., Inc., 733 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1984); Prouty v. National R.R. Passenger
Corp., 572 F. Supp. 200 (D.D.C. 1983).
866
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Discharge as a Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith
and Fair Dealing
Substantive Law and Underlying Policies
An implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing exists in every
contract. 152 However, treating an act of bad faith in contract per-
formance is a step courts are hesitant to take. Such torts have been
recognized in the insurance context. 153 But because implying such a
covenant in an at-will relationship would radically restructure the
employment relationship, and perhaps vitiate the at-will doctrine en-
tirely, the courts have thus far been quite wary of recognizing this as
a separate exception to the at-will doctrine. 54 The fear is that re-
stricting employers to good faith in firing would undermine
commerce.1
55
152. Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 658, 328 P.2d 198,
200 (1958). Nonetheless, in Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal.
3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984), the California Supreme Court
stopped short of providing a plaintiff in every case with the tort remedy of the implied
covenant. See infra notes 164-65 and accompanying text. See generally RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) CONTRACTS § 205 (1981); Uniform Commercial Code § 1-203 (1976); Bur-
ton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94
HARV. L. REV. 369 (1980); Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Dis-
charge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1840
(1980).
153. See, e.g., Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 668 P.2d 213 (Mont. 1983); Lipin-
ski v. Title Ins. Co., 202 Mont. 1, 655 P.2d 970 (1982) (relied upon by the Gates court).
154. Cases accepting the doctrine include: Moore v. Home Ins. Co., 601 F.2d 1072
(9th Cir. 1979) (applying Arizona law); Mitford v. de Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000 (Alaska
1983); Rulon-Miller v. International Business Machs., Inc., 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 208
Cal. Rptr. 524 (1984); Crenshaw v. Bozeman Deaconess Hosp., 693 P.2d 487 (Mont.
1984). Some jurisdictions initially accepting the doctrine have since limited it to viola-
tions of public policy. See infra notes 160-64.
Cases rejecting the doctrine include: Kempe v. Prince Gardner, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 779
(E.D. Mo. 1983) (applying Missouri law); Daniel v. Magma Copper Co., 127 Ariz. 320,
620 P.2d 699 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980); Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Hawaii 370,
377, 652 P.2d 625, 629 (1982); Martin v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 109 I11. App. 3d 596,
440 N.E.2d 998 (1982); Ising v. Barnes Hosp., 674 S.W. 2d 623 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984);
Murphy v. American Home Prods., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S. 2d 232
(1983); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984) (en
banc); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983); cf.
Shaitelman v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 517 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (under New
York law, termination in bad faith not a violation of public policy).
The Wyoming Supreme Court reserved the issue of approval of the doctrine in Rompf
v. John Q. Hammons Hotels, Inc., 685 P.2d 25 (Wyo. 1984), holding that the discharge
of a six-week employee ahead of later hires would not in any event violate the covenant
of good faith if it was necessitated by business concerns.
155. See Daniel v. Magma Copper Co., 127 Ariz. 320, 620 P.2d 699, 703 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1980); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 228, 685 P.2d
1081, 1086-87 (1984); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 569, 335
Few jurisdictions embrace the doctrine wholesale.1 56 The New
Hampshire Supreme Court, which produced the first "good faith"
case, Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 5 7 since has interpreted the good
faith covenant to apply only in discharge situations violating public
policy.15 8 Similar restrictions have been imposed in Massachusetts,' 59
Connecticut,'6" and Illinois,1 6' but have been rejected in Montana. 62
Although the California Supreme Court has yet to rule directly on
the applicability of the implied covenant of good faith to the at-will
employment relationship, 163 several indications appear that the court
would not take a restrictive view. In Seaman's Direct Buying Service
v. Standard Oil Co.,' 64 the court established a new tort of wrongful
denial of the existence of a contract. While refusing to extend the
concept of tortious bad faith breach to a commercial setting, the
court did mention that the characteristics of insurance contracts
which had precipitated the recognition of the tort in that area also
were present in the employment relationship.6 5
In California the first employment "go6d faith" case was Cleary v.
American Airlines, Inc.,"66 decided prior to Seaman's. In Cleary, an
eighteen-year employee was terminated allegedly in violation of the
procedures in the employer's personnel manual. Although the court
discussed the applicability of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, the opinion also refers to the implied-in-fact contract
exception to the at-will doctrine, and in fact the facts of the case fell
within the latter theory.
67
N.W.2d 834, 838 (1983); see also Dare v. Montana Petroleum Mktg. Co., 687 P.2d
1015 (Mont. 1984) (Morrison, J., concurring specially).
156. See cases cited supra note 154.
157. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
158. See Cloutier v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 121 N.H. 915, 436 A.2d 1140
(1981).
159. Compare Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co., 385 Mass. 300, 431 N.E.2d 908 (1982),
with Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977). A
discharge for the purpose of depriving the employee of earned benefits also is actionable.
See Maddaloni v. Western Mass. Bus Lines, 386 Mass. 877, 438 N.E.2d 351 (1982).
160. Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., Inc., 193 Conn. 558, 479 A.2d 781 (1984).
161. Dykstra v. Crestwood Bank, 117 Ill. App. 3d 821, 454 N.E.2d 51 (1983).
162. Crenshaw v. Bozeman Deaconess Hosp., 693 P.2d 487 (Mont. 1984). But see
Dare v. Montana Petroleum Mktg. Co., 687 P.2d 1015 (Mont. 1984) (the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing arises upon a showing of objective manifestations of the em-
ployer giving rise to the employee's reasonable belief that he or she has job security and
will be treated fairly).
163. The issue was reserved in Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167,
179 n.12, 610 P.2d 1330, 1337 n.12, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 846 n.12 (1980).
164. 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984).
165. Id. at 769 n.6, 686 P.2d at 1166 n.6, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362 n.6. The Chief
Justice would go further and recognize a cause of action in tort for breach of the cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 776, 686 P.2d at 1171, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 367
(Bird, C.J., dissenting).
166. Ill Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
167. This was recognized in Comerio v. Beatrice Foods Co., 600 F. Supp. 765, 769
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Cases decided after Seaman's attempt to refine an analysis in
which the tort of bad faith in the employment relationship should be
recognized. In Wallis v. Superior Court,16 8 a former employee
brought suit after his employer terminated retirement benefits. The
court developed an analysis designed to determine which types of
contractual relationships generate actions in tort for bad faith
breaches. Five factors were enumerated: inherently unequal bargain-
ing power between the parties; a motivation for entering into the
contract animated by an attempt to secure peace of mind and secur-
ity; inadequacy of ordinary contract damages to compensate the in-
jured party or make the breaching party accountable; special vulner-
ability of one party to harm; and awareness by the breaching party
of this vulnerability. 169 The court held that these factors were pre-
sent in the employment relationship in question. Nonetheless, appli-
cability of this concept of tortious bad faith breach in the commer-
cial setting was rejected in Quigley v. Pet, Inc.170
In Rulon-Miller v. International Business Machines, Inc.,71 the
court fused the Cleary discussion of the good faith covenant with the
unanswered questions left by Seaman's. IBM terminated the plain-
tiff after twelve years of employment, ostensibly because she had vio-
lated conflict of interest rules by dating a former IBM employee who
worked for a competitor. IBM's personnel policies gave the company
the right to terminate an employee on the grounds of conflict of in-
terest. The court, however, ruled that IBM acted in bad faith be-
cause no actual conflict of interest was present, and the reason there-
fore was a "pretext.' 17 The termination was held to be in bad
(E.D. Mo. 1985) (applying California law); see also Crozier v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,
150 Cal. App. 3d 1132, 1137, 198 Cal. Rptr. 361, 364 (1983); Cancellier v. Federated
Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1318 (9th Cir. 1982).
168. 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1984).
169. Id. at 1118, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
170. 162 Cal. App. 3d 223, 208 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1984).
171. 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1984).
172. Id. at 253, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 533; see also Crenshaw v. Bozeman Deaconess
Hosp., 693 P.2d 487 (Mont. 1984). But cf. Lampe v. Presbyterian Medical Center, 40
Colo. App. 465, 590 P.2d 513 (1978) (no cause of action despite allegations of false
reason for discharge; good faith theory not discussed).
Under principles established in Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S
248, 252-53 (1981), in an employment discrimination case arising under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing member-
ship in a protected class, an adverse employment decision, and his or her qualifications.
The defendant then must introduce evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for
the employment decision. The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to establish that
the defendant's purported reason is pretextual. Likewise, these principles have been ap-
plied in wrongful discharge situations. See, e.g., Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 588 F.
faith. 17  Furthermore, the court analogized the situation to Sea-
man's, conceding that IBM had acted wrongfully by denying its obli-
gation to the plaintiff. An attempt to shield oneself from liability
without "probable cause" was characterized as an act in bad
faith.1
7 4
Rulon-Miller is instructive on the content of the "good faith" obli-
gation. Several issues are raised by the attempt to define the obliga-
tion in the employment termination context. Rulon-Miller suggests
that the employer must have a legitimate reason for the termina-
tion.1 75 Equating "good faith" with "good cause," of course, sounds
the death knell for the at-will doctrine. Other courts, however, sug-
gest that an arbitrary termination, as opposed to one for a "bad"
reason, would not be in bad faith.17 6 Certainly, this is the import of
cases holding that a bad faith termination is the equivalent of one in
violation of public policy. It has been suggested, however, that proce-
dural content could be given to the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. 7 Under such a theory, a private employer may have to ac-
cord due process rights akin to those conferred upon public
employees'178
Supp. 562, 566 (E.D. Mich. 1984). In Crozier v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 150 Cal. App.
3d 1132, 198 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1983), the employee's suspicions regarding the employer's
improper motives for the terminations were held insufficient evidence of pretext.
173. Several other jurisdictions have refused to hold that a dismissal for violation
of a nonfraternization rule is wrongful. See Rogers v. International Business Machs.,
Inc,, 500 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Ward v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 95 Wis. 2d 372, 290
N.W.2d 536 (1980).
174. Rulon-Miller 162 Cal. App. 3d at 252-53, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 532-33.
175. Id. at 252, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 532. The court approved the trial court's instruc-
tions on bad faith, which included "whether or not the employee was discharged for
legitimate business and employment reasons. . . ." Id. at 252 n.6, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 532
n.6; see also Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1318 (9th Cir. 1982);
Walker v. Northern San Diego County Hosp. Dist., 135 Cal. App. 3d 896, 905, 185 Cal.
Rptr. 617, 622 (1982); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 330, 171 Cal.
Rptr. 917, 927-28 (1981); Dare v. Montana Petroleum Mktg. Co., 687 P.2d 1015, 1019-
20 (Mont. 1984). Good cause in the contract case of Confort & Fleming Ins. Brokers,
Inc. v. Hoxsey, 26 Wash. App. 172, 613 P.2d 138 (1980), was defined as "some causes
inherent in and related to the qualifications of the employee or a failure to properly
perform some essential aspect of the employee's job function." Id. at 177, 613 P.2d at
141.
176. See Gram v. Liberty Mut. Life Ins. Co., 391 Mass. 333, 461 N.E.2d 796
(1984).
177. Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d at 329 n.25, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927 n.25. Pugh specifi-
cally refused to reach the issue. See W. HOLLOWAY & M. LEECH, EMPLOYMENT TERMI-
NATION RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 385-94 (1985).
178. See Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d at 321 n.12, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 922 n.12
(198 1)(terming the issue "interesting"); Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp., 293 Or. 96,
99 n.1, 643 P.2d 1276, 1278 n.1 (1982) (refusal to rule on issue); see also Peck, Unjust
Discharges from Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. I
(1979). But see Murray v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 591 F. Supp. 1550 (S.D.
W. Va. 1984)(employer not required to treat employee fairly according to its promul-
gated rules); Ring v. R.J. Reynolds Indus., Inc., 597 F. Supp. 1277, 1281 (N.D. Ill.
1984) (applying Illinois law); Sheriff v. Revell, Inc., 165 Cal. App. 3d 297, 211 Cal.
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Liability under the bad faith rubric can serve a variety of pur-
poses: effectuating public policy if the discharge is in bad faith be-
cause it violates that- policy; enforcing the agreement and expecta-
tions of the parties in the contractual context; and implementing
judicially-imposed limits upon employer's dealings with employees in
pursuit of greater fairness and balance in the relationship. Given the
differences in bad faith cases, more than one statute of limitations
should be chosen depending upon the type of case pleaded. This also
makes it imperative that a plaintiff clearly allege the basis of the
claim so that such determinations can be made.
Choice of a Statute of Limitations
When the employer's bad faith consists of terminating the em-
ployee in violation of public policy, the statute of limitations chosen
for retaliatory discharges should apply to the purported "bad faith"
lawsuit as well. Certainly the purposes for imposing liability are
identical, and "bad faith," in such cases, is actually only another
term in which to clothe the public policy discharge claim. 179
In "bad faith" cases in which the employee claims that he was
terminated in violation of the employer's own procedures, there
should be no objection to applying the implied contract statute of
limitations, for the purpose of imposing liability in such an instance
is to vindicate the reasonable expectations of the employee based
upon the employer's words and conduct. And the contract statute
should be appropriate at a minimum for compensatory damage
claims.180
The most difficult situations are those in which the employer
seems to be treating the employee unfairly, even though no identified
public policy is violated by the employer's actions. Such situations
include: the arbitrary firing when the employee has not achieved the
longevity needed to make an implied-in-fact contract argument; the
pretextual firing when the real reason seems silly or petty but does
not violate law or public policy; and the discharge motivated by dis-
like, disagreement, or differing views of morality.
In such situations no principled basis can exist upon which to
Rptr. 465, 471 (1985); Crozier v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 150 Cal. App. 3d 1132,
1141, 198 Cal. Rptr. 361, 367 (1983)(rejecting analogy to expulsion from professional
association); Hurst v. Farmer, 40 Wash. App. 116, 697 P.2d 280 (1985)(no due process
rights against private employer).
179. See supra text accompanying notes 164-65.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 70-74.
choose a contract statute of limitations over a tort statute of limita-
tions. The claim contains elements of both, much the same as the
claim for breach of an insurer's implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. Principles assuring fairness to plaintiffs and predictabil-
ity of repose of actions to defendants suggest that the limitations
period be assigned by reference to the remedy desired.
Plaintiffs should be required to plead clearly the remedy sought. A
claim for compensatory relief, including emotional distress damages,
should be governed by the contract statute if longer than the tort
statute. A claim for punitive damages may be severed from the com-
pensatory damage allegations if the tort statute of limitations has
expired.
If contract treatment is chosen, the court must decide whether the
statute of limitations for written contracts or for oral contracts ap-
plies. While in the insurance context some courts have ruled that the
written contract limitations period applies despite the fact that the
covenant of good faith is "implied,"' 1 the shorter oral contract stat-
ute will be appropriate in discharge cases because no written em-
ployment contract exists. 82
If a tort statute is chosen over a contract statute, a further choice
between a personal injury and a property damage statute may be
required. The rights conferred upon an employee by virtue of his
employment contract generally are considered to be property
rights.18 3 With the authorization of emotional distress and punitive
damage awards for violation of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, however, the tort takes on the character of an action re-
dressing personal injury.
Claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress have been
held to be governed by the personal injury statute of limitations.,,"
In Richardson v. Allstate Insurance Co., 8 5 a passenger injured in an
automobile accident brought suit against the insurer for violation of
181. Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
182. See supra text accompanying note 147.
183. Carter v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 392 F. Supp. 494, 497 (S.D. Ga.
1974) (applying Georgia law); cf. James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 731, 155
P,2d 329, 335 (1944) (closed union and shop affect the "fundamental right to work for a
living"). In Edwards v. Fresno Community Hosp., 38 Cal. App. 3d 702, 113 Cal. Rptr.
579 (1974), the court held that a physician's interest in maintaining hospital privileges
was in the nature of a property interest which directly related to the pursuit of his liveli-
hood. Affording private sector employees a property right in their employment is sug-
gested in Note, Non-Statutory Causes of Action for an Employer's Termination of an
"At Will" Employment Relationship: A Possible Solution to the Economic Imbalance
in the Employer-Employee Relationship, 24 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 743 (1979); see also
Glendon & Lev, supra note 99. The United States Supreme Court has stated that an at-
will employee has no property right in his or her employment. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S.
341, 345 n.8 (1976).
184. See supra note 135.
185. 117 Cal. App. 3d 8, 172 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1981).
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the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court sustained
demurrers to plaintiff's causes of action for breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing and conspiracy, ruling that the one-
year personal injury tort statute of limitations barred the claims. The
appellate court reversed, ruling that the two-year property damage
statute applied. Analogizing the claim to one for interference with
contractual relations, the court reasoned that the presence of allega-
tions of emotional distress damages did not undermine the fact that
it was financial loss, or risk of financial loss, which defined the cause
of action.186
The claim for wrongful discharge generally involves both an inva-
sion of a personal interest and a property interest, both personal in-
jury damages and the economic loss involved in the loss of a job.
While one solution could be an indulgence in comparisons of the
magnitude of these respective losses, the better choice would be sim-
ple recognition of the plaintiff's right to choose. Thus, in California
the one-year personal injury statute should apply to claims for emo-
tional distress and punitive damages and the two-year property dam-
age statute to claims for financial damage such as lost wages and
benefits. Such a choice would effectuate the policy expressed in the
different limitations periods contained in these statutes.
CONCLUSION
Because the appellation "wrongful discharge" covers a variety of
claims, supported by different principles and motivated by different
purposes, coordination of these claims with the confusing selection of
statutes of limitations is an arduous process. Prospective application
may be necessary.' 87 When choices must be made, they should be
186. Id. at 13, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 426. In Purdy v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 157 Cal.
App. 3d 59, 203 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1984), the court ruled that a claim for emotional dis-
tress was not separate from a claim against an insurer for bad faith failure to settle. The
court characterized the underlying claim as sounding in both tort and contract, and as a
claim involving invasion of a property interest. Following Richardson, the two-year stat-
ute of limitations for such claims was applied despite the existence of the emotional dis-
tress allegations.
187. Prospective application of a statute of limitations to a particular cause of ac-
tion is appropriate if the plaintiff, due to his or her reliance upon past precedent or due to
the fact that the case is one of first impression the resolution of which was not clearly
foreshadowed, reasonably could not have known which limitations period would apply.
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-09 (1971). Applying a chosen statute of
limitations prospectively would protect the interests of the particular plaintiff in the same
way as the rule that the longer statute applies when a choice must be made. See supra
text accompanying note 52. Nonetheless, the court would be able to make a reasoned
choice of the limitations period for future cases.
made with a view towards consistency in the law, effectuation of the
purposes of the substantive law and of statute of limitations policy,
amenability to prediction by potential litigants, and simplicity of ap-
plication. In some situations this should result in allowing plaintiff to
elect to proceed with such claims as he or she may have for remedies
not barred by the most applicable statutes.
Another solution is a uniform statute. For example, Indiana has
adopted a two-year statute of limitations for actions relating to the
terms, conditions and privileges of employment, excluding actions
based upon written contract.8 8 If applied to all of the theories of
wrongful termination, such a statute would achieve a high measure
of predictability and simplicity of application. The price, however,
would be possible inconsistency in the treatment of plaintiffs' claims.
For example, if the general oral contract statute is longer than the
employment statute, the employee asserting a claim for breach of
implied contract under the theory of Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc.'89
would be given a shorter period in which to file than any other party
to an oral contract. Thus, any movement towards adoption of a gen-
eral employment or discharge statute of limitations should include
investigation and consideration of the various policies animating the
different theories of wrongful discharge before a uniform period of
limitations is calculated and approved.
188. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-2-1.5 (Burns Supp. 1985).
189. 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981). See supra notes 141-45
and accompanying text.
